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Toward a Feminist Theory of the Rural
The (con)fusion between women’s situation and women’s identity
pervades public discourse.1
Judith Baer (1999)
Given the pervasiveness of the rural/urban opposition and its related
significance in the construction of identity, it is remarkable that the
explosion of scholarly interest in identity politics has generally failed to
address the rural/urban axis. The resulting representation of social
distinctions primarily in terms of race, class, and gender thus masks the
extent to which these categories are inflected by place identification.2
Barbara Ching and Gerald Creed (1997)
Feminist scholars have long lamented law’s inattentiveness to and
misunderstanding of the day-to-day realities of women’s lives.3 Anti-essentialists have
argued that feminism must look beyond gender as the sole site of subordination to other
factors, such as race, class, and sexual orientation, which shape women’s lives, including
their encounters with law. I draw on both arguments in this article as I call attention to
rural women as a distinct population, differentiated by place. I argue that the social,
political and economic realities that shape rural women’s lives are largely ignored in
many legal contexts. In the rare cases when they are acknowledged, the role that this

1

JUDITH BAER, OUR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW 63 (1999). “If we fail to discuss what has been done to
women, we leave out a huge part of reality. We limit the insights we can reach about people who do these
things and about a society that lets them do it and teaches them how.” Id. at 62.
2
KNOWING YOUR PLACE: RURAL IDENTITY AND CULTURAL HIERARCHY 3 (Barbara Ching & Gerald
Creed, eds., 1997). Professors Ching and Creed have also argued that “[t]he rural/urban distinction
underlies many of the power relations . . . .” and that “the city remains the locus of political, economic and
cultural power.” Id. at 17.
3
See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 6, 34 (2005) (arguing that we
“should analyze the legal issues in terms of the real issues, and strive to move law so that the real issues are
the legal issues”); BAER, supra note 1, at 40-67 (advocating “situation jurisprudence,” which focuses on
women’s situation and what has been done to women and criticizing “character jurisprudence,” which
emphasizes “essential gender distinctions”).
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critical factual context plays in defining women’s choices is often downplayed or
dismissed in relation to the legal issue at hand.
I discuss below the relevance of place to rural women’s situation in three different
contexts: domestic violence, termination of parental rights, and abortion. With respect to
each of these, I assess whether and how the relevant legal doctrines sufficiently
accommodate information about the lived realities of rural women. I reveal, for example,
that legal analyses of domestic violence and termination of parental rights often ignore or
discount the added vulnerability and hardship that rural women often experience by
virtue of their rural setting. In the abortion context, I illustrate how courts have
consistently dismissed or denied the structural barriers that prevent many rural women
from exercising their constitutional right to an abortion.
In Part I, I detail the rural milieu, to the extent that it can be generalized across
regions, with particular focus on the structural disadvantages under which rural people
labor. These disadvantages stem from poor economic and educational opportunity
generally, as well as inadequate housing, transportation, and child care, specifically.
While a great deal of the information I present as a foundation to my argument relates to
the socioeconomic disadvantage that marks rural people and places, my argument is not
merely based upon class.4 It is also about other characteristics of rural America, such as
spatial isolation, lack of anonymity within communities, and social norms that value
men’s autonomy and women’s dependency.

4

See Ann R. Tickamyer, Public Policy and Private Lives: Social and Spatial Dimensions of Women’s
Poverty and Welfare Policy in the United States, 84 KY. L. J. 721 (1995-96) (discussing the feminization of
poverty). See also Diane Pearce, The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work and Welfare, 11 THE URBAN
& SOCIAL CHANGE REV. 28, 29 (1978) (citing D.S. Knudsen, The Declining Status of Women: Popular
Myths and the Failure of Functionalist Thought, SOCIAL FORCES, 1969) (noting that the higher the
percentage of workers who are female in a given occupation, the lower the occupation’s average income).

-3-

In Part II, I provide a theoretical framework for conceptualizing rural women’s
differences as disadvantage and for arguing that place merits attention in our analysis of
many gender issues. Drawing on the work of Catharine MacKinnon, I assert that we
must attend to the details of women’s lives – that we should “strive to move law so that
the real issues are the legal issues.”5 Based on the work of Judith Baer, I argue that we
must focus on women’s situation rather than on their character.6 In this regard, I reveal
the aggravated disadvantage and multi-faceted vulnerability that rural women experience
by virtue of place and the spatiality of social relations. Building on anti-essentialist
scholarship, I argue that geography matters, just as race, sexual orientation, and other
factors do. Rurality is highly relevant to many legal analyses, even though law has rarely
recognized it. Being a rural woman may thus represent a significant component of
identity. Just as being a woman of color is a greater element of identity than being
white,7 being a rural woman can be a critical aspect of how one sees oneself, even though
being an urban woman may not be.
Part III discusses three different contexts in which courts have had an opportunity
to consider how characteristics of rural areas influence adjudication of cases: domestic
abuse, termination of parental rights, and abortion. In discussing each of these, I
illustrate law’s ignorance of – or indifference to – rural realities. I also contrast law’s
5

MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS supra note 3, at 34.
BAER essentially renames dominance theory, associated with radical feminists, situation theory. She
explains that “the implication that dominance is a universal feature of women’s lives is contentious, the
assertion that women’s situation has been a subject one is incontrovertible.” She thus refers to theories that
emphasize dominance as theories of women’s situation. “Situation theory (jurisprudence) holds that what
makes law male is the fact that men use it to subordinate women.” BAER, supra note 1, at 41.
7
Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 604 (1990)
(anecdote of West Coast fem critics meeting at which all women were asked to pick two or three words to
describe themselves; none of the white women mentioned race, while all of the women of color did). In
each pairing, black/white and rural/urban, the former is the outsider, the minority, while the latter
represents the default or the norm. It is thus the former about which society must be educated and
sensitized.
6
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typically insensitive responses to these women-specific issues with more empathic
judicial handling of non-gendered legal issues that similarly implicate the spatial isolation
and lack of anonymity characteristic of rural areas.
While law has many definitions of the term “rural,”8 I use it in this article
primarily to connote sparsely populated places.9 But rural places have more in common
than low population density, and I also use the term to refer to the conglomeration of
characteristics generally associated with rural areas: close-knit community where
residents tend to be familiar with one another, more tradition-bound and conservative
thinking, the spatial isolation created by low population density, and socioeconomic
disadvantage.
By my claim “toward a feminist theory of the rural,” I do not purport to articulate
“epic theory”10 as MacKinnon did in her germinal text under a similar title.11 Rather, my
aim is to theorize how rural women have been disadvantaged by law’s ignorance of – or
callousness about – the practical realities that shape their lives. In positing how law’s
urban presumption and bias have undermined rural women, I re-conceptualize the
significance of rurality to women’s lives, particularly as those lives encounter the law.

8

See Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) at Part II.
The distances typical of rural areas go hand in hand with the fact that “all rural areas share one common
characteristic: relatively low population densities.” BRUCE A. WEBER, GREG J. DUNCAN & LESLIE A.
WHITENER, RURAL DIMENSIONS OF WELFARE REFORM: WELFARE, FOOD ASSISTANCE AND POVERTY IN
RURAL AMERICA 7, 456 (2002).
10
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE x (1989) (citing Sheldon
Wolin, Political Theory as a Vocation, 63 AM. POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 1087-80 (1967)).
11
Id.
9
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I: Rural Women, Rural Realities
Rural scholars warn that diversity among the country’s rural places makes it
difficult to generalize accurately about the rural populace.12 Yet, studies of women in
areas ranging from Appalachian Kentucky to rural Michigan reveal some similarities.
Rural women’s lives are shaped by conservative views, including those regarding the
proper roles of women.13 Their educational attainment is relatively low,14 and they are
often under-employed.15
A. Political and Social Trends.
Some social and cultural differences between rural and urban areas dissipated or
disappeared with the decline of the family farm and the corresponding decrease in rural
population.16 Family size and birth rates are now similar in rural and urban areas,17 and
advances in transportation and communication have reduced rural isolation.18 Despite
some blurring between rural and urban in recent decades, however, rural individuals still
tend to hold more traditional beliefs than those who live in cities.19 Sociologists attribute
this, at least in part, to the types of relationships rural people form as a result of decreased
12

Cynthia B. Struthers & Janet L. Bokemeier, Myths and Realities of Raising Children and Creating
Family Life in a Rural County, 21 J. OF FAMILY ISSUES 17, 41 (2000). See also infra note 306.
13
Public Opinion Strategies and Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Report for the W.K. Kellogg
Foundation, Election 2002: Rural Voter and Rural Issues, 37 (2002), available at
http://www.wkkf.org/DesktopModules/WKF_DmaItem/ViewDoc.aspx?
fld=PDFFile&CID=4&ListID=28&ItemID=43791&LanguageID=0. “Rural women are actually stronger
GOP partisans than their male counterparts, are more supportive of conservative religious groups, [and] are
more conservative than non-rural men on self-reported ideology...” Id.
14
Id. at 24. Forty-two percent of rural women have attained a high school education or less compared with
24 percent of urban women. Twenty-six percent completed some college, as opposed to 30 percent of
urban women; 32 percent graduated from college or went beyond, compared with 45 percent of metro
women.
15
J. Brian Brown & Daniel T. Lichter, Poverty, Welfare, and the Livelihood Strategies of Non-metropolitan
Single Mothers, 69 RURAL SOC’Y 282, 295 (2004).
16
Don E. Albrecht & Carol Mulford Albrecht, Metro/Non-metro Residence, Nonmarital Conception, and
Conception Outcomes, 69 RURAL SOC’Y 430, 433 (2004).
17
Id. at 435.
18
Id. at 433.
19
Id. at 449-50.
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population size and density: the closer interaction among people within a rural
community leads to “greater levels of consensus on important values and morals.”20
The conservative views of so-called non-metro21 residents are evident in rural
voting tendencies. Until the latter part of the 20th century, rural voters aligned themselves
with Democratic candidates who “tapped into the economic concerns of rural districts.”22
But the 2002 elections marked the fifth consecutive election in which rural voters
overwhelmingly supported Republican candidates,23 and President Bush carried the vast

20

Id. at 435.
I use the word “non-metro” to indicate “rural” when the study cited uses the Offfice of Management and
Budget’s designations of metro and non-metro, which are defined slightly differently than the U.S. Census
Bureau’s “rural.” Housing Assistance Council, Taking Stock: Rural People, Poverty, and Housing at the
Turn of the 21st Century, December 2002, at 11, available at
http://ruralhome.org/pubs/hsganalysis/ts2000/index.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Taking
Stock]. The U.S. Census Bureau uses the term rural to mean “all territory, population, and housing units
located outside of urbanized areas and urban clusters with a population of 2,500 or less.” It defines urban
as including all territory, population, and housing units located within an "urbanized area" or "cluster."
U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Urban and Rural Classification, available at
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/ua/ua_2k.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2006). This definition delineated the
boundaries of "urbanized areas" and "urban clusters" to encompass densely settled territory, which consists
of: (1) "core census block groups or blocks that have a population density of at least 1,000 people per
square mile, and (2) surrounding census blocks that have an overall density of at least 500 people per
square mile." Id.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) uses the terms metropolitan (metro) and nonmetropolitan (non-metro) to refer to essentially the same dichotomy. Non-metro areas are outside
metropolitan areas and have no cities of 50,000 or more. Metro areas, on the other hand, are those with at
least 50,000 residents or with an urbanized area of 50,000 or more and total area population of at least
100,000. Metro areas thus include suburbs and other areas near them that are socially and economically
integrated. Office of Management and Budget: Standards for Defining Metropolitan and Micropolitan
Statistical Areas (December 27, 2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/0032997.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2006). Some scholars have pointed out that the definition of non-metro
areas is a narrow one that excludes 29 million people who live in small towns with fewer than 2500
residents or in open territory, but who are classified as metro because they are within a metro county.
RURAL DIMENSIONS OF WELFARE REFORM, supra note 9, at 19, n.4. I nevertheless treat the terms as
essentially synonymous for my purposes because both refer to sparsely populated areas that are removed
from urban centers. See also Rural Rhetoric, supra note 8 (analyzing complexities of rural classification).
22
Gregory L. Giroux, Recalibrating the Rural Voter’s Place, CQ Weekly, June 23, 2005.
23
W.K. Kellogg Foundation, Cultural Issues in Rural America Gave Republicans a Wide Margin of
Success in Recent Election: Gender Gap Narrower among Rural Voters, Rural Voter Study Shows (2002),
available at
http://www.wkkf.org/DesktopModules/WKF_DmaItem/ViewDoc.aspx?fld=PDFFile&CID=4&ListID=28
&ItemID=43792&LanguageID=0#search=%22rural%20voters%20(%22tabid%3D101%22%20OR%20%2
2ViewDoc.aspx%22%20OR%20%22tabid%3D55%22)%22 (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
21
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majority of rural districts in both the 2000 and the 2004 Presidential races.24 This change
has been attributed to conservative views espoused by Republicans on topics that rural
voters feel strongly about, including gun control, abortion, and religion.25 When rural
communities do elect Democrats to Congress, their voting records are more conservative
than those of urban Democrats.26
As for rural women, they tend to marry younger and at a greater rate than urban
women.27 Rural women also have a tendency toward more traditional views about
women, believing that their primary role is to bear, raise and protect children.28 Nonmetro women’s views about abortion are generally more conservative than those of their
urban counterparts, with rural women significantly more likely to support pro-life rather
than pro-choice candidates. 29 A study of nonmarital conceptions among rural and urban
women found that those in rural areas were more likely to carry a fetus to term and to
marry before the baby’s birth.30

24

CQ Weekly, Who Represents the Different Demographics (2005). In 2000, Bush beat Gore in 47 of the
61 rural districts, and in 2004 he beat Kerry in 51 districts. Gore carried 70 of the 90 urban districts in
2000. In 2004, Kerry won in 65.
25
Id.
26
Giroux, supra note 22, at 1724. “In most cases, rural-district Democrats have voting records in line with
their conservative-leaning constituencies but at odds with their party’s more liberal leaders. As of
Memorial Day, four of the five House Democrats who hade the lowest ‘party unity’ scores so far this
year—meaning that they often voted with the Republicans and against most fellow Democrats on mainly
party-line votes—came from rural districts…” Id.
27
Struthers & Bokemeier, supra note 12, at 34.
28
JUDITH IVY FIENE, THE SOCIAL REALITY OF A GROUP OF RURAL, LOW-STATUS, APPALACHIAN WOMEN,
41 (1993). See also Struthers & Bokemeier supra note 12, at 28.
29
Public Opinion Strategies and Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, supra note 13, at 36-37. Forty-four
percent of rural women would vote for a pro-life candidate; only 29 percent would vote for a pro-choice
candidate. Thirty-four percent of urban women would vote for a pro-life candidate while 45 percent would
vote pro-choice.
In addition, rural women surveyed in New York and Kentucky voiced extreme anti-abortion
sentiments. See JANET FITCHEN, POVERTY IN RURAL AMERICA: A CASE STUDY (1981) (indicating strong
opposition to abortion among New York women interviewed); FIENE, supra note 28, at 44-45 (indicating
Kentucky women’s rejection of abortion even when the pregnancy results from rape).
30
Albrecht & Albrecht, supra note 16, at 444, 447.
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B. Poor Economic Opportunities, Major Structural Disadvantages
More than 55 million people – almost 20% of Americans – live in non-metro
areas.31 Of the 14.6 percent of these living in poverty,32 women, children and people of
color represent a disproportionate share.33 Indeed, about one-third of non-metro, femaleheaded households live in impoverished conditions.34
Myriad reasons account for rural women’s poverty, among them the limited
economic opportunities and deficits in human capital that plague rural communities.
While the 2000 census reported a median household income in metro areas of $44,755,
the median income in non-metro areas was only $33,687, about three-quarters of the
metro level.35 Indeed, non-metro workers earn, on average, 28 percent less than their
metro counterparts.36 This is no doubt related to the fact that only 15 percent of nonmetro residents have at least a bachelor’s degree, compared to 25 percent of all U. S.

31

Housing Assistance Council, Taking Stock: Rural People, Poverty, and Housing at the Turn of the 21st
Century, December 2002, at 9, available at http://ruralhome.org/pubs/hsganalysis/ts2000/index.htm (last
visited Sept. 3, 2006).
32
Id. at 20. According to the 2000 Census, 14.6% of the non-metro population were poor, while the
poverty rate nationwide was 12.4% and the rate in metro areas was 11.8%. Id. See also Rural Poverty
Research Center, Place Matters: Addressing Rural Poverty, 3 (April 2004), available at
http://www.rprconline.org/synthesis.pdf (last visited Sept.5, 2006). Eighty-four percent of U.S. counties
with poverty rates above the national average are non-metro. Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 20.
33
Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 21-22. The HAC lists housing problems, low wages (especially
compared to wages earned by men), and a shortage of adequate child care as some of the factors that
contribute to the severity of non-metro women’s poverty. Id. at 21.
34
Id. at 21-22. In 1995, 50.8 percent of rural female-headed families with children lived in poverty
compared to 40.1 percent of their urban counterparts. Linda K. Cummins, Homelessness Among Rural
Women, in THE HIDDEN AMERICA: SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN RURAL AMERICA FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (Robert M. Moore III, ed. 2001) at 63 (citing Housing and Assistance Counsel).
35
Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 20.
36
Id. at 19. See also Struthers & Bokemeier, supra note 12, at 42 (noting that poverty results not only from
not wanting to work but also from inability to find employment that allows parents to support their
families); David A. Cotter et al. Gender Inequality in Non-metropolitan and Metropolitan areas, 61 RURAL
SOCIOLOGY 272, 282 (1996). But see Georgeanne M. Artz & Peter Orazem, Reexamining Rural Decline:
How Changing Rural Classifications and Short Time Frames Affect Perceived Growth, Office of Social
and Economic Trend Analysis, Technical Report 06-014, Iowa State University (January 2005), at 9-10
(arguing that income and employment growth in rural areas over past thirty years is significantly greater
than reported by 2000 Census, due to change in Census definition of “rural”).
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residents.37 Despite the more traditional nature of rural culture, metro and non-metro
women are employed at equal rates.38 Yet, rural women earn only about half of what
men in rural areas are paid for similar jobs,39 a ratio close to that between urban women
and urban men. Women residing in rural areas are thus at a significant economic
disadvantage relative to all metro workers, as well as to rural men.
Changed rural employment opportunities have affected both male and female
workers in recent decades. Historically, rural economies were grounded in so-called
extractive industries, including farming, mining, logging, and fishing.40 Manufacturing
and service jobs have more recently become staples of rural economies.41 Consumer
service jobs comprise one-third of non-metro employment.42 In addition, rural people are
more likely than urban people43 – and rural women more likely than rural men (73
percent to 39 percent) – to work in manufacturing.44 Both categories of jobs have
drawbacks. The former are subject to market whims and overseas relocation, thus
providing little security.45 While the flexibility of service jobs can accommodate a
mother’s schedule, it may also mean fewer hours, lower earnings, and poor benefits.46 In

37

Taking Stock, supra note 21,at 16.
Cotter et al., supra note 36, at 280, 282.
39
Cummins, supra note 34, at 86 (citing A. Bushy, “Rural Women: Lifestyle and Health Status,” 28 Rural
Nursing 187-97 (1993)). Nevertheless, male to female earnings ratios are similar in rural and urban areas.
Cotter et al., supra note 36, at 280, 282.
40
Robert M. Gibbs, Rural Labor Markets in an Era of Welfare Reform in RURAL DIMENSIONS OF WELFARE
REFORM, supra note 9, at 51, 56. Rural economics are typically not diversified. The economy of a given
rural area traditionally concentrates on one means of supporting the community, usually by farming,
mining, timber, and manufacturing. ROBERT M. MOORE III, THE HIDDEN AMERICA: SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN
RURAL AMERICA FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 59 (2001).
41
See Gibbs, supra note 40, at 56.
42
Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 19. This number has risen seven percentage points since 1990. Id.
43
In 2000, manufacturing accounted for 18 percent of all jobs in non-metro areas but 14 percent
nationwide. Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 18. Thirteen percent of non-metro women worked in
manufacturing, compared to 10% of metro women. Gibbs, supra note 40, at 59.
44
Gibbs, supra note 40, at 59; Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 19.
45
Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 18.
46
Gibbs, supra note 40, at 59.
38
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sum, women tend to be employed in “low-wage, unstable, secondary-sector,” gendersegregated jobs.47
Rural women frequently rely on elaborate, carefully balanced social networks for
support and assistance, and to supplement their incomes.48 Rather than turning to social
service agencies, women often look to each other for help with child care, transportation,
and even occasionally paying bills.49 In return, they offer the same services to others
within their networks, either as payment for assistance given or as a down payment, of
sorts, for a future favor.50 By utilizing a combination of these networks and informal
work, rural women are sometimes able to avoid welfare and maintain their independence.
The broad economic picture of rural America is thus disheartening, but the
situation of women within it is even more so. In the following sections, I discuss
transportation, child care, and housing. These represent structural obstacles that weigh
very heavily on the rural female population, who have even fewer resources than rural
men to devote to them.51

47

Barbara Wells, Women’s Voices: Explaining Poverty and Plenty in a Rural Community, 67 RURAL
SOCIOLOGY 235, 236 (2002).
48
FIENE, supra note 28, at 64-66; MARGARET K. NELSON, THE SOCIAL ECONOMY OF SINGLE MOTHERHOOD
63-92 (2005) (examining the attitudes toward welfare of women who receive it).
49
Nelson, supra note 48, at 75.
50
FIENE, supra note 28, at 65; Nelson, supra note 48, at 81. Women tend to request only as much as they
are willing to give, knowing they may otherwise be expelled from the network. Nelson, supra note 48, at
77. One woman described the relationship as: “like the checking account—first you put the money in and
then you make the withdrawal and there’s no problem. It’s when you do it the other way around [that]
there’s red ink.” Id. at 67.
51
Rural women likely face greater pressure related to housing and other problems than do rural men
because of the lower earnings of the former. Wendy Boka, Domestic Violence in Farming Communities:
Overcoming the Unique Problems Posed by the Rural Setting, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 389, 399 (2004). The
extremely high poverty rates among female-headed families in rural areas and the shortage of housing in
rural areas leave rural women very vulnerable to homelessness. Id.
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1. Transportation. The long distances that typically separate rural residents
from jobs, services, and other people make reliable transportation a necessity.52 It is thus
not surprising that rural Americans spend a higher percentage of their income on
transportation than do urban ones.53 In light of those expenditures, it is ironic that more
rural counties than urban ones have a high rate of car-lessness.54 Indeed, while rural
residents are more reliant upon public transportation than their urban counterparts, they
have fewer public transport options.55 Indeed, less than a tenth of all federal funding for
public transportation goes to rural areas,56 and only about 60% of rural counties offer it.57
Of those using rural public transportation, 62% are women. 58 Such transportation

52

Katherine Porter, Going Broke the Hard Way: The Economics of Rural Failure, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 969,
1001. See also Signe-Mary McKernan, Robert Lerman, Nancy Pindus, & Jesse Valente, Impact of Welfare
Policy on the Employment of Single Mothers Living in Rural and Urban Areas, in RURAL DIMENSIONS OF
WELFARE REFORM, supra note 9, at 262.
53
Porter, supra note 52, at 1008 (citing a Bureau of Labor Statistics report entitled Consumer Expenditures
in 2001). In 2001, rural households spent 25% of their income on transportation, whereas urban
households spent only 19%. The average transportation expenditure for a rural household exceeded that of
its urban counterpart by almost $1000 more. Id.
54
United States Department of Agriculture, Agriculture Information Bulletin Number 795, Rural
Transportation at a Glance, at 1 (January 2005), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/AIB795/AIB795_lowres.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2006) [hereinafter
Rural Transportation at a Glance]. A high rate of car-lessness is at least twice the average rate of
carlessness. Id. According to the USDA, more than 1.6 million rural households have no car.
Nevertheless, in 2000 rural households had access to a car at a slightly higher rate (92.7%) than urban ones
(88.9%). Id. at 3.
55
See also Porter, supra note 52, at 1026; Susan Murty, Regionalization and Rural Service Delivery 207 in
THE HIDDEN AMERICA, supra note 34; MOORE, THE HIDDEN AMERICA, supra note 34, at 27. But see
USDA, Rural Transportation at a Glance, supra note 54, at 1 (stating that recent increases in federal
funding and greater state and local control have led to improvements in rural roads and public
transportation).
56
Rural Transportation at a Glance, supra note 54, at 3. In this report the USDA relies on the OMB
definition of rural. Id. at 6. Nevertheless, rural public transportation services grew in the 1990’s. Nonmetro providers offered 62 percent more passenger trips, 93 percent more miles traveled, and 60 percent
more vehicles (vans and buses) available.” Id. at 3.
57
Id. at 3. Twenty-eight percent of these counties offer only limited services, meaning fewer than 25 trips
per carless household, per year. Id.
58
Id. at 4. Thirty-one percent of users were elderly, and 23 percent were disabled. Id. Rural residents,
particularly those in high poverty areas, are more reliant on public transportation than their urban
counterparts. Id. at 3.
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challenges put rural residents at a disadvantage for getting access to employment, health
care, child care, and other services.59
2. Child care. The nature of rural job markets and the omnipresent issue of
distance mean that rural residents have fewer child care options than urban ones.60
Because there are fewer child care centers per capita in rural areas,61 only 25 percent of
rural children under age five are cared for in such centers, compared to 35 percent
nationwide.62 For poor rural families, the federally-funded Head Start program may be
the only tenable center-based child care option,63 but it may not offer all-day programs
that permit women to work full time. 64
Seventy-five percent of rural children in child care are in private residences other
than the child’s home.65 Known as “kith and kin” arrangements,66 these offer the

59

Services are often located in the county seat or some other distant regional location. See Murty, supra
note 55, at 204-05.
60
A lack of child care resources creates an added obstacle for mothers who are trying to find work or leave
abusive relationships. Wendy Boka, Domestic Violence in Farming Communities: Overcoming the Unique
Problems Posed by the Rural Setting, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 389, 397 (2004).
61
Laura J. Colker & Sarah Dewees, Child Care for Welfare Participants in Rural Areas, Rural Welfare
Issue Brief, Macro International Inc. (November 2000), at 2. Also, rural child care providers “tend to be
less educated and trained than their metropolitan counterparts,” resulting in lower quality care. Id. at 2
(citing the Rural Policy Research Institute, Rural America and Welfare Reform: An Overview Assessment,
1999, available at http://www.rupri.org/pubs/archive/old/welfare/p99-3).
62
Colker & Dewees, supra note 61, at 2 (citing Carpizzano et al., Child Care Arrangements for Children
under Five: Variation Across States, The Urban Institute, 2000, and Beach, Perspectives on Rural Child
Care, ERIC Clearinghouse on Rural Education and Small Schools, ERIC Digest, EDO-RC-96-9, 1997).
63
Colker & Dewees, supra note 61, at 3. Head Start, created under the U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services, is a child development program serving children up to the age of five. Head Start
programs “have the overall goal of increasing the school readiness of young children in low-income
families.” To participate, families must meet low-income eligibility. U.S. Department of Health & Human
Services, Administration for Children and Families, available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/hsb/about/index.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).
64
Id. at 3.
65
Id. at 3-4 (citing Beach, 1997, and Atkinson, “Rural and Urban Families’ Use of Child Care,” in 43
Family Relations 16-22 (1994)). Nationally, 15 percent of preschool children are cared for in the homes of
licensed child care providers. Id. (citing Casper, “Who’s Minding Our Preschoolers?” in Current
Population Reports Household Economic Studies, P70-62, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1997).
66
“Kith” are friends and neighbors and “kin” are relatives. Id. One study found that rural residents are
twice as likely as urban dwellers to use kith and kin arrangements. Low-income families are 50 percent
more likely to use it than their wealthier counterparts. Colker & Dewees, supra note 61, at 4 (citing Beach,
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advantages of flexibility67 and low cost, and may feature informal payment schemes.68
The quality of care is inconsistent, however, and may prove unreliable.69
Finding adequate, quality child care is thus a great challenge for rural parents who
work outside the home. This burden surely falls more heavily on women because they
are even more likely than their urban counterparts to be responsible for child care, given
the traditional views of rural communities. As a consequence, rural women often work
part-time or engage in informal employment activities so that they can care for their
young children. 70
3. Housing. While the past several decades have seen many improvements in
rural housing,71 almost 30 percent of non-metro residents still face housing problems,72
the most common being affordability.73 About 5.5 million rural households pay in excess
of 30 percent of their monthly income for housing.74 Worse yet, housing costs consume
more than half of the incomes for another 2.4 million.75 Housing quality presents another
challenge in non-metro areas, where 1.6 million units are moderately or severely

1997, Atkinson, 1994); Collins & Carlson, Child Care by Kith and Kin: Supporting Family, Friends, and
Neighbors Caring for Children, National Center for Children in Poverty, Columbia University, 1998).
67
This flexibility includes options for drop-in child care and extended hours. Id. at 3.
68
These may include bartering, or trading services, but most are on a fee-paying basis. Id. at 4.
69
Id. at 3-4. Local regulations governing licensure in rural areas are typically not as stringent as
metropolitan ones. Id. at 3 (citing Beach, 1997).
70
See e.g., Struthers & Bokemeier, supra note 12 at 25 (stating that rural women believe parenting is “their
most important job” and that household work is often based on “a gendered division of labor”); Tickamyer,
supra note 4, at 738 (noting that “women with young children are more likely to engage in productive
(economic) activities close to their reproductive (childrearing and household) responsibilities). But see
Katherine MacTavish and Sonya Salamon, What do Rural Families Look Like Today? in CHALLENGES FOR
RURAL AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 77 (pointing out that many older rural children “may
find themselves in latchkey situations” due to parental employment outside the community).
71
Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 24.
72
Id. at 31. “Over 6.2 million non-metro households have at least one major problem … [and about]
662,000 rural households have two or more housing problems.” Id.. “Problems” include affordability
issues, substandard quality, and crowding. Id.
73
Id. at 31.
74
Id. at 28.
75
Id. at 28.
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substandard.76 As one example, while rural homes comprise only one-fifth of the
nation’s total housing units they account for over 30 percent of houses with inadequate
plumbing.77
Sixty-eight percent of the nation’s households are owner-occupied, an all-time
high in home ownership.78 While non-metro residents enjoy an even higher rate of
homeownership, at 76 percent,79 this does not necessarily indicate greater wealth, wellbeing or stability.80 The higher rate of rural home ownership is due in part to
manufactured homes, which are twice as common in non-metro areas as they are
nationwide.81 But manufactured homes are not as beneficial to consumers as
conventional single-family homes because the former tend to depreciate in value82 and
are financed with higher-rate, personal property loans.83 Rural housing assets also tend to

76

Id. at 30. This represents 6.9 percent of non-metro units. Additionally, people of color in non-metro
areas are almost three times more likely to live in substandard housing than their white counterparts. Id.
77
Id. at 30.
78
Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 24-25.
79
Id. at 25.
80
The national median value of a home is $120,000, while that of a non-metro home is $80,000. Taking
Stock, supra note 21, at 32.
81
Id. at 24. Although non-metro areas have less than a quarter of the nation’s housing units, these areas
have over half of manufactured homes. Id. at 27. While the quality of manufactured homes has improved
in recent years, more than a third of non-metro mobile home residents live in units at least 20 years old. Id.
at 26. Manufactured housing is the fastest growing segment of rural housing stock, accounting for 38
percent of homes built between 1996 and 2001. Ezra Rosser, Rural Housing and Code Enforcement:
Navigating Between Values and Housing Types, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLICY, at 18 (2006) (citing
2001 National Housing Survey).
82
Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 26, 32. Manufactured homes depreciate at a rate of 1.5 percent annually
compared to an annual appreciation rate of 4.5 percent for conventionally constructed single-family homes.
Further, manufactured homes in rural areas appreciate less than those in urban settings. Id. This is
particularly troubling considering that a “home is the most valuable asset most Americans will ever own.”
Id at 32. The median purchase price of a new manufactured home in non-metro areas is approximately
$41,000, compared to $130,000 for a new single-family home. Id. at 26.
83
Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 26, 32. One factor is the type of financing used to purchase manufactured
homes. Most new manufactured homes are financed with personal property loans. Id. This type of loan is
less beneficial for the consumer than conventional housing loans because of higher interest rates and
shorter terms. Id. at 26. About one-tenth of non-metro owners with a mortgage pay an interest rate of 10
percent or more. This is nearly double the proportion of metro owners who pay such high rates. Id. at 32.
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be less liquid because rural home owners are often tied to their specific location.84
Finally, recent shifts in emphasis by federal housing programs have reduced the amount
of assistance available to the significant number of rural households that rely upon it.85
C. Conclusion
Rural America, then, is an economically depressed place that offers few
opportunities to enhance human capital. The people who reside there are faced with
particular structural obstacles, often related to the physical distances that separate them
from services. While gender specific data were not available for each of these, it is
reasonable to surmise that because rural women earn substantially less than rural men,
they are less likely to own a vehicle or to be in a stable housing situation. Rural women
are, in fact, one of the poorest groups of people in the United States.
The social and political portrait of rural America also lends insights into
expectations of the women who live there. Rural residents tend to hold more
conservative political views, and their expectations of women’s roles tend to be more
traditional and more rigid. These factors, like economic and structural ones, severely
limit women’s opportunities, as well as their day-to-day choices.
II: A Role for Place in Feminist Theory
At least two strands of feminist thought accommodate or facilitate theorizing
about rural women and what distinguishes their situation from those of other groups of

84

Rosser, supra note 81, at 14. Farmers often make their living from the land on which their homes are
located, and non-farmers “are limited by the fact that these small towns cannot support a commercial rental
market except on a very small scale.” Id.
85
Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 34. Federal assistance is crucial for many households, as indicated by a
USDA Economic Research Service study that found that ninety percent of rural borrowers would probably
not have been able to afford their homes without federal assistance. Id. at 33. The shifts have been to
indirect subsidies such as loan guarantees and tax incentives. However, only 3 percent of guaranteed loans,
as opposed to 44 percent of the program’s direct loans, served very low-income households in FY 2003.
Id. at 34.
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women. Radical feminism’s focus on power disparities is useful for conceptualizing how
rural women’s differences not only from men, but also from urban women, operate to
their disadvantage. Anti-essentialism scholarship acknowledges the complexity of each
woman’s identity and circumstances. Such multiple perspectives thinking can and should
also attend to the role of place in women’s lives.86
Radical feminist Catharine MacKinnon’s work centers on the experiences of
women and the operation of power in society.87 She asserts that “[w]omen have
systematically been subjected to physical insecurity; targeted for sexual denigration and
violation; depersonalized and denigrated; deprived of respect, credibility and resources;
and silenced – and denied public presence, voice and representation of their interests.”88
For rural women, these deprivations and denials, as well as the vulnerability and
hardship they beget, are often aggravated by their geographical circumstances.89 Their
low socioeconomic status aggravates their physical insecurity and denies them credibility
and resources. So do the practical challenges they face in accessing child care,
educational opportunity, good jobs and even government assistance. Rural women’s
physical distance from those who can assist or rescue them aggravates their vulnerability
to physical violence by intimates and others.90 Further, in their more traditional
communities, rural women are more definitively relegated to the private sphere of hearth

86

See generally Tickamyer, supra note 4 (arguing for greater attention to spatial issues in research and
theorizing about women and poverty).
87
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI-KENT L. REV. 687 (2000).
88
See, e.g., MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 10, at 160.
89
Of course, many others have criticized MacKinnon for focusing solely on the role of gender in these
social hierarchies while overlooking other markers of identity. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 7 (arguing that
MacKinnon and Robin West had inadequately accounted for race, placing white women at the center of
their work); Pat Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 191
(1989-90) (arguing that MacKinnon and West had excluded the lesbian experience from their theorizing).
90
See generally Boka, supra note 60.
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and home. Their only “public” presence, typically, is in low-wage, dead-end
employment.
In a similar vein, radical feminist Judith Baer advocates what she calls situation
jurisprudence, arguing that feminist legal theory must “develop analyses that will
separate situations from the people experiencing them.”91 She asserts that failure “to
discuss what has been done to women . . . leave[s] out a huge part of reality.”92 Baer
distinguishes between situation jurisprudence and what she calls character jurisprudence,
which focuses on the nature or character of women.93 Situation jurisprudence, on the
other hand, disputes liberalism’s presumption of autonomy because our sexist society
denies it to women.94
In support of her argument against this presumption of autonomy and her focus on
women’s situation, Baer calls attention not only to women’s vulnerability, but also to the
responsibility and duty they bear, particularly in relation to care-giving. She
acknowledges that MacKinnon “captures the objectification, the danger, and the
vulnerability” of being a women, but argues that MacKinnon overlooks or discounts the
work, the demands, and the domestic burdens heaped on women.95 Of women’s duty,

91

BAER, supra note 1, at 68.
Id. at 62.
93
Id. at 40-67. Baer writes:
Critiques of situation jurisprudence fall into the same trap as character jurisprudence:
they let men and institutions off the hook while focusing women’s attention on
themselves. Whereas character jurisprudence threatens to trap women in gender-role
expectations, critical reaction to situation jurisprudence threatens to frustrate gender-role
expectations, critical reaction to situation jurisprudence threatens to frustrate gender-role
change. Character theory has produced an ethic of burden and obligation; situation has
theory has been read as an insult to women.
Id. at 62.
94
BAER, supra note 1, at 55. Baer notes that a rights conceptualization as problematic because “they
isolate individuals in theory when they are not independent of one another in reality.” Id. (quoting Wendy
Brown, Reproductive Freedom and the Right to Privacy: A Paradox for Feminists, in FAMILIES, POLITICS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 331 (Irene Diamond, ed. 1983)).
95
Id. at 57.
92
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Baer writes: “It’s not only the lying down that oppresses, but the jumping up: the
expectation that one is available to meet others’ needs is a crucial component of the
women’s situation.”96 This, too, is part of gendered power.
Baer discusses another way in which law (and scholars of character jurisprudence,
in particular) uses the theme of responsibility against women: the “popular idea” that
people are responsible for their own trouble. She notes the specific examples of blaming
victims of domestic violence and poverty for bringing those problems onto themselves.97
Baer refutes the accuracy of these claims, suggesting that holding victims responsible for
their problems is a “useful conservative tool.”98 She notes that it is easier to oppose
policies that might reduce poverty and abuse if individuals are held responsible.99 Taking
battered women as an example, Baer writes that “the abuse belongs to her, not to the
abuser or the society in which the abuse occurs. The term ‘battered woman’ itself
incorporates this premise; society defines the problem in terms of victims, not in terms of
violent husbands and lovers.”100
Baer’s attention to women’s situation in all of its complexity can obviously serve
the interests of rural women, who are literally situated in physical isolation from each
other, as well as from services, educational and economic opportunity, and more. Both
aspects of “responsibility” that Baer discusses are also highly relevant to rural women.
While women tend to bear greater responsibility for child and other dependent care than

96

Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 63.
98
Id. at 65.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 66. Baer asserts that the battered woman’s situation “may not be her fault in the sense of
causation, but it is her fault in the sense of being her misfortune.” Id. The phenomenon Baer describes is
illustrated in the judicial opinion of Swails v. State, discussed infra notes 115-116 and accompanying text,
where the court uses the passive voice in writing that “Connie Landers was beaten by her boyfriend, Kevin
Swails.”
97
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do their male partners, 101 rural women appear even more burdened than their urban
counterparts, due in large part to the more rigid and traditional gender role expectations
of rural communities. The poor educational and employment opportunities available to
rural women, coupled with the dearth of quality child care, further constrain those who
seek employment outside the home in lieu of – or in addition to – fulfilling these
traditional roles.102
As for the phenomenon of viewing women as responsible for their own woes, it is
evident, too, in law’s responses to rural women. Law too often fails to appreciate the
strength of the structural barriers that constrain rural women’s choices, instead blaming
them for their unfortunate circumstances and consequences. I return to a discussion of
this phenomenon below in relation to judicial adjudication of parental rights and domestic
violence questions.103 Judicial assumptions of individual responsibility – for both the
consequences of having sex and of living in an inconvenient place – also loom large in
the abortion context.104
Next, my analysis draws on anti-essentialist scholarship to argue for inclusion of
the critical context that place – and the rural milieu in particular – can represent in both
theorizing women’s subordination and responding to it. Anti-essentialists have long
maintained that gender is not the sole basis of women’s disempowerment. As scholars
have drawn attention to the intersection of gender and race, or gender and sexual
101

See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER (2000); see also W. Jean Yeung et al., Children’s Time
With Fathers in Intact Families, 63 J. OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 136, 148 (2001) (looking at the amount
of time fathers spend with their children and finding, based on analyses collected in 1997, that “the relative
time fathers in intact families were directly engaged with children was 67% that of mothers’ on weekdays
and 87% that of mothers’ on weekends”); Tickamyer, supra note 4, at 725 (referring to agreement among
feminists that women’s disproportionate responsibility for reproductive labor and care-giving contribute to
high poverty among women).
102
See supra notes [ ] and accompanying text (discussing the employment patterns of rural women).
103
See infra Parts III (a) and (b).
104
See infra Part III (c).
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orientation (among others), I assert the need for attention to the intersection of gender and
place. I maintain that a rural setting is legally relevant to more issues than the law
currently acknowledges and that it is relevant, in particular, to many women-specific
issues.
In her landmark 1990 article on anti-essentialism, Angela Harris explained that
gender essentialism was dangerous because “experiences of women perceived as
different are ignored or treated as variations on the (white) norm.”105 In the rare cases
when law has seen and engaged rural women, recognizing them in relation to place, it has
viewed these women simply as variations on an urban norm. Frequently, however, law
has not seen or identified rural women as such; rather, it has looked right past their rural
circumstances. This phenomenon is reflected by rural scholars who have remarked,
“[w]e are an urban society now, one that is pretty sure we know what ‘urban’ is, but not
at all sure we know what ‘rural’ is.”106
Just as Sylvia Law defined “heterosexism” as the “pervasive cultural presumption
and prescription of heterosexual relationship,”107 I query whether law functions under a
pervasive cultural presumption of urbanism. But place – like race, sexual orientation, and
class – is inextricably linked to the experiences of rural women as they encounter law.
To illustrate this, I introduce here some of the stories of rural women, as reflected in
judicial narratives, putting them in context and bringing them into the broader
conversation about women and law.108

105

Harris, supra note 7, at 615.
Elizabeth Beeson & Marty Strange, Why Rural Matters: The Need for Every State to Take Action on
Rural Education (Aug. 2000), at http://www.ruraledu.org/streport/summary.html.
107
Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 195.
108
See Harris, supra note 7, at 585 (writing that she introduces the voices of black women to destabilize
and subvert the unity of MacKinnon’s and West’s “woman”).
106
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III: Rural Women in the Presence of Law
I discuss in this Part judicial (in)attention to the realities of rural women in the
contexts of domestic violence, termination of parental rights, and abortion. The first two
of these are somewhat similar in that the relevant legal doctrines accommodate a multifactor, contextual analysis that ultimately assesses the appropriateness of a woman’s
actions. That is, adjudication of domestic violence cases usually involves passing
judgment on whether a woman was justified in defending herself or whether she acted
under duress in responding to intimate abuse. Decisions to terminate parental rights are
also multi-faceted, involving a comprehensive assessment of a parent’s behavior.
The legal inquiry regarding abortion is somewhat narrower: What constitutes an
undue burden on a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy? While applying this test
theoretically involves a fact-intensive analysis of the consequences of the regulation in
question, courts have been very miserly about deeming regulations to constitute undue
burdens, even in the face of highly compelling factual records. In several cases, the U. S.
Supreme Court and other federal courts have disregarded the structural realities of rural
women’s lives which, in combination with abortion regulations, prevent those women
from exercising their right to an abortion.
A. Domestic Violence.
Bring sanity to bear on the notion that a woman victimized by a physically
abusive man must go to an outdoor toilet for refuge and cannot seek that
refuge in her [car] where the doors lock and the victim has mobility to
further escape if necessary.
-Cynthia Hage,
Victim of domestic violence charged with DUI
State v. Hage (Minn. 1999)
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Intimate abuse is part of the factual background in many legal contexts, including
those that adjudicate the assault, battery, or death of a battered woman or her abusive
partner. Whether a woman’s behavior was appropriate or reasonable may become an
issue, for example, if she harms or kills her assailant. A woman’s perception of the threat
to her, as well as her firmness in the face of that threat, may become issues if she
acquiesces to become her abuser’s partner in crime. Lenore Walker, who coined the term
“battered women’s syndrome,” brought to light the complexity of an abused woman’s
psychological condition.109 Like Walker, many have criticized law’s unease with or
incapacity to accommodate appropriately the battered woman scenario.110 Some calling
for reform have proposed the substitution of a reasonable woman111 or a reasonable
battered woman112 standard. Others have called for a move away from the imminence
standard, endorsing instead a jury determination of when deadly force is necessary.113
In this section, I consider how a woman living in a rural area, or merely present in
one, may experience aggravated vulnerability based on spatial isolation from others, in
particular from sources of aid. I look in detail at several cases in which a woman in a
rural area claimed that she responded under duress to intimate abuse. The decisions in
109

See, e.g.,LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984); LENORE E. WALKER,
TERRIFYING LOVE, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF DEFENSE AS LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION 23-40 (1987) (arguing that the behavior of battered women who kill needs to be understood
as normal, not crazy); see also ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED W OMEN KILL 127-30 (1987)
(identifying some predictive factors for when women kill their abusers).
110
See, e.g., Walter Steele & Christine Sigman, Reexamining the Doctrine of Self Defense to Accommodate
Battered Women, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 169, 175-76 (1991); Laura Reece, Women’s Defense to Criminal
Homicide and the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Need for Relocation of Difference, 1 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 53, 55 (1991); Stephen J. Schulfhoer, The Gender Questions in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL.
& POL’Y 105, 127 (1990); CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF
DEFENSE, AND THE LAW (1989).
111
See Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self Defense, 8
Harv. Women’s L.J., 121, 152 (1985).
112
See Kit Kinports, Comment, Defending Battered Women’s Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393,
416 (1988).
113
See Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C.L.
REV. 371 (1993).
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these cases reflect a lack of understanding of the quandary faced by victims of such
crimes, particularly when their dilemma is heightened by physical distance from those
who could render assistance.114
In Swails v. State,115 the Texas Court of Appeals upheld a trial court’s refusal to
instruct the jury regarding the defense of duress to murder. The refused instruction came
in the face of the female defendant’s argument that she had been terrorized by her
boyfriend, who initiated the murder plan. The majority opinion in the case recited these
facts:

114

A rural setting is sometimes relevant to the outcome of a domestic violence case for reasons other
than enhanced vulnerability. Specifically, low population density sometimes often fosters lack of
anonymity among those in a rural community, and that familiarity may be legally relevant. See generally
Boka, supra note [ ]. A 2004 decision of the Connecticut Superior Court is a good example of a court’s
understanding the lack of anonymity that marks rural communities and applying the law in light of that
reality. The court held that the estate of a woman murdered by her ex-boyfriend could sue in negligence
the small municipality in which she lived for failing to protect her. Florence v. Town of Plainfield, 48
Conn. Supp. 440, 849 A.2d 7 (2004). The decedent had repeatedly sought protection from police, who
failed for several weeks to execute an arrest warrant against the former boyfriend. Indeed, the trial court
found it “hard to imagine what more a desperate woman could do to reach out for police protection . . .
and to construct a situation of such delay and failure of police to appreciate the gravity of the situation
and act accordingly.” Id. at 453, 849 A.2d at 21. The court suggested that because the parties lived in a
small town, the police department would be expected to have working knowledge of such ongoing
situations, making its failure to act even more inexcusable. The court wrote that the police department in
this rural area knew or should have known of the defendant and “his antisocial and criminal propensities
by reputation if not by personal contact.” Id. at 444, 849 A.2d at 10. Somewhat offensive was the court’s
effort to distinguish the case at hand from other domestic violence situations, the significance of which it
dismissed. The court wrote:
[T]his was not simply one of those, regrettably routine, calls for domestic violence
assistance. Situations are presented to police departments daily where two ordinarily
law-abiding citizens may be involved in an intrafamilial disturbance marked by
threats or scuffling brought on my momentary anger or intoxication. There are many
levels of complaints which require judgment and discretion on the part of the police
officers engaged in the stressful daily pursuit of their duties. This was not an
ordinary case of domestic violence.
Id. at 451, 849 A.2d at 14.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reached the contrary conclusion in a somewhat similar case.
In Arthurs v. Aiken County, the court held the sheriffs department not liable for failure to protect Deborah
Munn from her husband, who threatened her and her family three times on the day he killed her. Munn
declined sheriff deputies’ suggestions that she go to a safe house. 346 S.C. 97, 551 S.E.2d 579 (2001).
The court noted that because the husband was not present at the scene when the deputies responded, he
was not subject to immediate arrest. The court concluded that the officers neither owed nor breached a
duty to Munn. Id. at 107, 551 S.E.2d at 584.
115
986 S.W.2d 41 (Texas App. 1999).
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One evening in 1994, Connie Landers was beaten by her
boyfriend, Kevin Swails, because she had no money to give him. Later
the couple went driving. During the drive, Kevin told Connie they were
going to rob and kill an old man because Kevin wanted his money and
guns. After this conversation, the couple drove to Waldo Blanke’s house
and parked their car in front of his door. While Connie sat in the car,
Kevin knocked on the door. Blanke answered, and Connie heard Kevin
telling Blanke “we’re going to play a game old man” and then saw Kevin
shock Blanke with a 2000 volt stun gun and begin pushing and hitting him
repeatedly. Connie, still in the car, heard Blanke saying “oh God, Kevin,
oh God.”
At first, when Kevin yelled at her to come inside, Connie did
nothing. But then Kevin yelled that he would kill her if she did not come
inside. Connie walked inside and, when Kevin told her to get something
with which to strangle Blanke, she gave him a radio she found on a nearby
table. As Connie watched, Kevin hit Blanke in the head with the radio,
pushed him onto the couch, and fell with him onto the floor. Connie then
saw Kevin put the radio cord around Blanke’s neck and pull on one end of
the cord. Connie held the other end with her knee.116
Kevin and Connie then took Blanke’s guns, jewelry and money to their car. They
married several days later.117
Connie asserted the defense of duress in response to the State’s capital murder
charges. She argued that Kevin presented a threat of death or serious bodily injury to her
and that he had previously threatened, stalked, and physically assaulted her. Expert
testimony supported her argument that a person of reasonable firmness might not have
been able to resist Kevin’s efforts to force her participation in the crimes. The trial court
nevertheless rejected Connie’s request for jury instructions regarding duress, and the jury
found her guilty of capital murder.118
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Id. at 42.
Id.
118
Id. at 43.
117
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The Texas Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision not to instruct
the jury regarding duress because the defense “was not raised by the evidence.”119 The
court explained that a “defendant is ‘compelled’ to engage in proscribed conduct ‘only
if the force or threat of force would render a person of reasonable firmness incapable of
resisting the pressure.’”120 Further, “the threatened death or serious bodily injury is
‘imminent’ only if it will occur in the present, not in the future.”121 Finally, the court
explained, for duress to apply, the defendant must not have “intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly [placed herself] in a situation in which it was probable that [s]he would be
subjected to compulsion.”122
The court did not see Kevin’s threats to kill Connie as evidence that she was
“compelled to enter the house by a threat of imminent death or serious bodily
injury.”123 It noted that, to the contrary, Connie knew of Kevin’s intent to rob and kill
Blanke, and she knew that he entered the house with “only a stun gun,” an apparent
reference to the fact he was not a serious threat to her. The court observed that Connie
“sat alone in the car ––outside the reach of Kevin,” for “some period of time,”124
suggesting that she should have taken “this opportunity to leave the scene.”125 Because
she instead entered the house,126 the court found that if “Kevin’s threat is construed to
mean he would hunt Swails down and kill her if she did not go inside Blanke’s house, it
was a threat of future, not imminent, harm.”127
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Id. at 45.
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 45-46 (citing Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §8.05(d)).
123
Id. at 46 (double emphasis original).
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id..
127
Id.
120
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It was dissenting Judge Alma L. López who pointed out the relevance of the
rural setting to the determination of whether sufficient evidence supported Connie’s
argument of duress. After reciting the history between Connie and Kevin, Judge López
noted that “Kevin yelled, screamed and terrorized Connie and told her he would kill
her, too” as they drove away from the murder scene.128 She noted that Connie had
“visibly observed Kevin killing the victim” and that he had threatened her, too, if she
did not assist him. Judge López thus concluded it was “logical” that “Connie felt
threatened and compelled to help Kevin or risk losing her life.”129 He had, after all,
killed Blanke while armed only with a stun gun. She took issue with the majority’s
implication that Connie was “necessarily free to leave the scene during the murder,”
arguing that no evidence supported this assumption. In doing so, Judge López revealed
some facts that the majority had omitted.
The scene of the murder is located in rural Bandera County.
Although the photographic exhibits suggest other lake homes in close
proximity to the Blanke home, there is no testimony that any of these
homes were occupied at the time of the offense so as to serve as an
immediate source of aid or sanctuary.130
Noting that the car they had driven was parked “next to the front door, just a few steps
from where Kevin was yelling his threats of violence to Connie,” Judge López also
commented on the lack of evidence as to who controlled the car keys. She concluded:
“Would a person of reasonable firmness, who had suffered three beatings that very day
from him, have considered Kevin’s threats and commands to present only future danger
to her under these circumstances? I think not.”131
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Judge López thus picks up on the enhanced vulnerability that women may
experience when threatened in rural areas. Because they are physically removed from
others who might rescue them or render assistance, these women are at even greater risk
than those who are otherwise similarly situated. The majority’s assumption that Connie
was not under duress as a result of Kevin’s threats depends, in part, upon her ability to
escape to a place where he could not reach her. Yet Judge López disputes the majority’s
inference that because Kevin carried “only a stun gun,” he did not present an imminent
threat to Connie so long as she was not within arms’ reach. While the majority appears to
assume that Connie could outrun Kevin and make her way to a safe place with even 20yards’ head start, Judge López is doubtful that Connie could escape Kevin and that a safe
place existed. She notes the rural locale in support of her conclusion that the jury should
have been permitted to determine whether Kevin was an imminent threat to Connie, and
not merely a future one.
While scholars have argued for a legal standard other than imminence in cases
of intimate abuse, Professor Holly Maguigan’s research indicates that the real problem
in cases where battered women kill is not existing law.132 The legal standard of
imminence is less the problem, she concludes, than judges’ interpretation of the law in
ways that do not permit the question to get to the jury. The Texas courts’ handling of
Swails supports Maguigan’s argument.
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See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform
Proposals, 140 Pa. L. Rev. 370, 382-87, 457-58 (1991) (arguing that the real problem in cases where
battered women kill is not existing law, but judges’ interpreting the law in such a way that self-defense
instructions rarely get to the jury).
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In State v. Hage, 133 a jury did get the opportunity to consider the reasonableness
of a battered woman’s actions. The jury found she was not under duress when she used
her car as refuge from her abusive boyfriend. The Minnesota Supreme Court, on
appeal in this 1999 decision, showed no more empathy for her plight, upholding her
conviction for being in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol.
On the day in question, Cynthia Hage’s boyfriend became violent with her after
they argued. He had been physically abusive to her in the past, and on this occasion he
slammed her hand into a table with force sufficient to draw blood. She left their trailer
home and took refuge in her car.134 A law enforcement officer responded to a report
from Cynthia’s boyfriend that she was drunk and sitting in her car. The officer, who
had responded to a domestic disturbance call there in the past month,135 found Cynthia
sitting in the driver’s seat. The car was not running, but the keys were in the ignition.
Whether Cynthia had driven the car from their home to the county road or whether it
had been parked there all day was disputed.136 Both field sobriety and breathalyzer
tests confirmed Cynthia’s intoxication, and she was charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol.137
The court denied Cynthia’s request for an instruction on “self defense/retreat”
and instead instructed the jury on the defense of necessity.138 Specifically, it instructed
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Id. at 202.
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Id. at 203.
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gravel driveway led from County Road 93 to their home, some evidence indicated that it was not passable
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the jury that Hage bore the burden of proof to show that her actions were necessary
because of an emergency situation “where the peril is instant, overwhelming and leaves
no alternative but the conduct in question.”139 After the jury found Cynthia guilty, she
moved for a judgment of acquittal on the basis that the jury had failed to consider
adequately her emergency circumstances. She argued specifically “that the court bring
sanity to bear on the notion that a woman victimized by a physically abusive man must
go to an outdoor toilet for refuge and cannot seek that refuge in her [car] where the
doors lock and the victim has mobility to further escape if necessary.”140 The trial court
denied her motion. It noted that “other options were available to Hage besides seeking
refuge” in the driver’s seat of her car,141 but it did not specify what these options were.
The issue on appeal was whether the jury had been properly instructed, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court found no error.
It is difficult to squabble with a jury determination on an instruction such as the
one given in Hage. The argument can be made, of course, that as a matter of policy,
the burden of proof that Cynthia was not facing an emergency should lie with the state.
But the real lesson from cases like Hage may be one for defense lawyers. Perhaps
Cynthia’s plea on her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, had it been
made to the jury in closing argument, would have resulted in a different outcome. The
jury might have empathized if focused more upon the predicament Cynthia faced that
day: remain in the trailer with an abusive man, hide in an outhouse, or sit in a car with
locking doors. It is thus imperative that defense lawyers present these situations to
juries in all relevant detail, playing the “rural card,” if you will.
139
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Insensitivity to the peril of the female defendant in opinions such as Swails and
Hage is ironic in light of judicial recognition elsewhere of the added vulnerability – even
helplessness – associated with rural places.142 Judicial narratives in criminal cases, for
example, often suggest the greater susceptibility of rural residents to crime, a
vulnerability stemming from their physical distance from those who could thwart a
criminal act or render assistance in its wake.143 In a 1979 decision, for example, the
Alaska Supreme Court upheld the maximum sentence for an escapee who fled to a
remote fishing camp where he committed several thefts and broke into some
smokehouses. The court based its decision on the vulnerability of rural residents, even
though the defendant injured no one there.144 By way of explanation, the court wrote that
the residents “don't have the assurance that people in the more developed areas and
communities might have that they can secure some protection by picking up the phone
and calling a police officer from a nearby police station who can quickly get over to that
area in a car. People are simply much more on their own and simply don't have that kind
of security.”145 Thus, the court concluded, the escapee’s actions “must be considered as a
very serious offense against the public.”146
As a related matter, judicial narratives often note that the defendant took his

142

Courts sometimes expressly recognize that rural residents’ isolation exposes them to other perils, too. In
a 1987 Mississippi case, for example, the court repeatedly noted the vulnerability of an elderly, rural
woman whose phone service was wrongfully disconnected. South Central Bell v. Epps, 509 So. 2d 886
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893-94.
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victim to a rural area, suggesting he could thereby evade detection.147 Indeed, the
vulnerable position in which some victims are put when taken to rural areas leads to
conviction of a more serious offense. In a 2002 Texas case, the defendants kidnapped,
sexually assaulted, and then released their victim in a rural area.148 They argued on
appeal that they should not have been convicted of aggravated kidnapping, but rather of a
lesser offense, because they had released the victim in a “safe place.”149 The appellate
court agreed with the trial judge that the victim had not been released in a safe place,
noting testimony that the place was “in the country,” “mainly fields and that sort of
thing” with a few trailer houses and a bait shop.150
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court found sufficient the jury instructions in a 1977
case in which the defendants kidnapped and robbed their victim before abandoning him,
without his trousers, boots, coat or glasses, “on an unlighted, rural road.”151 In poor
visibility from blowing snow, and a temperature near zero,152 the victim was struck and
killed by a speeding pick-up truck 20 minutes later. The defendant argued that he could
147

See, e.g., Lingar v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 1998) (defendant drove young male victim to rural
area, ordered him to disrobe and masturbate before shooting him); Ponder v. State, 713 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.
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Wis.2d 699, 624 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. App. 2d 2000) (defendant kidnapped woman, took her to a “home in
rural Crawford County” where he sexually assaulted her); Pilkinton v. State, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 2879
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“not have anticipated the fatal accident.”153 The judge advised the jury that “a person
acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance . . . when he is aware of and
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or
that such circumstance exists.”154 The perilous situation in which the defendants left the
victim – including the rural location – thus supported the finding of “a substantial and
unjustifiable risk” of death.
While most cases in which the vulnerability stemming from spatial isolation has
influenced a legal outcome do not involve gender issues, a few do. In a 2004 decision,
for example, the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld an administrative law judge’s ruling
that an employer had sexually harassed two women who worked in his home, which
served as the office for his elevator installation business.155 The court determined that the
employer, sole proprietor of the business, harassed two secretaries who worked for him
for consecutive periods. Among the allegations were that he appeared before them semiclad (no shirt) and finished dressing in their presence; showed pictures of himself and his
prior girlfriend skinny dipping; said his bathtub was large enough for two; called them
into his bedroom to see something on television; and told them that he should put golden
arches, standing for “2,000 served” over his bed.156 The court quoted the ALJ’s findings
of fact (endorsed by the Indiana Civil Rights Commission), with respect to each woman,
that the woman and her employer “worked in a house, with nobody else present, subject
to visitors rarely and only by appointment and that the house was located in a rural,
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sparsely populated area.”157 In upholding the decisions below, the court cited Seventh
Circuit precedent for the proposition that the “presence or absence of other persons and
other aspects of context” are relevant to the determination of harassment.158 The opinion
emphasized the rural location of the employer’s home-based business – noting it three
additional times.159 The court thus clearly saw the rural setting – because it connoted the
absence of the other persons – as critical context in assessing sexual harassment.
Similarly, some intimate abuse cases have also acknowledged the aggravated
vulnerability associated with presence in rural areas. The Nebraska Court of Appeals in
2001, for example, cited a woman’s situation in a rural area as justification for shooting
her husband. The court held that the sentencing judge had abused his discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence on the woman.160 He explained that she was “in a rural
area with an intoxicated and angry person with a history of physical abuse who had only
moments earlier abused her.”161 In another case, an abusive husband’s frequent threat
while beating his wife, that “no one would ever hear a gun shot coming from their rural
residence,” was cited in justification of a $340,000 damages award for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.162 These decisions, as well as those in other criminal
contexts that recognize the enhanced vulnerability attendant to distance from sources of

157
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assistance, are good models for appropriate legal responses to rural women facing
intimate abuse.
B. Termination of Parental Rights
The reservation is in a very rural area and commuting to Las Vegas is fifty
plus miles. And, we had at that time no suitable day care at the
reservation. He was an infant. We had Head Start, but there was no way
for her to leave him.
Social worker testifying about obstacles to
employment facing mother, whose parental
rights were at stake.
In re Bow (Nevada 1997)
The same structural barriers that contribute so significantly to rural poverty – poor
educational and job opportunities, lack of child care and transportation, among others –
frequently shape the situations that put rural mothers at risk for termination of their
parental rights. Procedures and substantive law regarding termination of parental rights
vary somewhat from state to state, but they usually involve a fact-intensive inquiry that
scrutinizes the given parent’s behavior. Courts frequently discuss not only the parent’s
history of interaction with the child(ren), but also her employment record, education
level, and other factors, such as tolerance of domestic violence.163 While some courts
show considerable empathy for the particular challenges a rural parent has faced, others
appear oblivious to the realities confronting her.
In some cases, the very decision to live in a rural area is held against a mother. In
such cases, the rural locale of the mother’s home appears to be the proverbial last straw,
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Indeed, in many jurisdictions, domestic violence is included on a list of factors to be considered in
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as other factors already weigh against her. In a 2001 Iowa decision, for example, the
court opined that the mother had “not demonstrated that she can act in the best interests
of her children.”164 The court cited as an example the fact that she “was living in a trailer
park in a rural area, isolated from services, shopping, or neighborhood resources.”165 It
noted both the mother’s lack of transportation and the lack of services within walking
distance,166 having already recited the mother’s history of abusive relationships, as well
as her job and housing insecurity while her case was pending.167
A 2002 Delaware decision held against the mother her decision to live with her
mother, the child’s grandmother, “in rural New Castle County along Route 13 away from
regular lines of public transportation,” which made her dependent on others to get to
work.168 While the court listed a number of other factors in support of its decision to
terminate the mother’s parental rights,169 it also noted that the mother had rejected the
option of relocating to a shelter where she could “receive services and live with her
daughter.”170
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While these courts recognized the added transportation challenges and attendant
isolation from services that rural parents face, they appear not to see that the given parent
has few housing options other than those in the rural locale. By judging women harshly
for living in rural areas and suggesting that they move to more populous ones, these
decisions go beyond the remedial actions dictated in other contexts. That is, in the
workers’ compensation and disability settings, for example, courts have held that rural
residents need not re-locate to a larger job market in order to secure replacement
employment. They are allowed to receive benefits while continuing to live in rural areas
where the limited labor market leaves them without appropriate employment options.171
By suggesting a woman should have moved to the city or should do so now, these
parental rights cases also imply that places are fungible. In so doing, they overlook
another rural reality: the greater attachment to place that many rural residents feel.172 As
discussed in Part I, many rural women are reliant on the networks they have accrued in
their home community, and abandoning them would represent a significant loss.173 By
telling these women to move to the city, courts reveal their urban bias.
Other judges are more attuned to the realities of rural living and sensitive to its
consequences. A dissenting judge in a 1997 Nevada case, In Re Bow, showed particular
sensitivity to the burdens stemming from spatial isolation from educational options and
foster homes, as well as the limited job opportunities available to rural parents.174 The
Native American mother whose rights were at stake, Adrina Recodo, was living with her
171
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grandparents in rural Southern Nevada when she gave birth to her son Michael.175 When
Michael was 14 months old, Recodo voluntarily placed him in foster care because she
was unable to care for him.176 She and the tribe’s social worker made a six-month plan
whereby Recodo would complete her GED, look for employment in Las Vegas on
weekdays, and care for Michael on weekends.177
During this time Recodo struggled to get into Las Vegas everyday. She drove her
grandfather’s car until she was unable to afford gas, and then she stayed with friends or
studied and slept in her car. According to the case report, “Recodo also testified that at
this point her financial situation was so bad that often she would not eat for days just so
she could afford to drive to Las Vegas to attend school and to try to find a job.”178
Eventually, Recodo no longer had access to a car, but she rode her bike or tried to get
rides with friends into Las Vegas.179 Conflicting evidence was presented regarding the
frequency of Recodo’s visits to her son, but a trial judge determined that she saw him
only three times during one 15-month period.180 She held two jobs during part of that
period but lost both because of insubordination.181
A judge terminated Recodo’s parental rights to Michael following a hearing in
May, 1995, and the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the decision.182 Justice Springer
disagreed, offering this alternative summation of facts in dissent:
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Recodo had four other children at the time of the hearing. Three lived with her former husband, who
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Id. at 1129. Justice Springer disputed the voluntary nature of the placement. Id. at 1137.
177
Id. at 1130.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 1131.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 1134. The appellate court found sufficient evidence to support the decision, and it concluded that
she had not been denied her due process rights.

- 38 -

Adrina Recodo was the victim of an abusive domestic relationship,
and she sought the help of a social worker on the Paiutes Reservation,
stating that she was having problems taking care of her son after she got
out of the relationship. She told her case worker that she had no income,
no place to live, and no transportation. In need of money, food and a place
to live, the State's response was to send Ms. Recodo to a psychologist.
The State also decided to take her son away from her and to place him in
foster care. Ms. Recodo was destitute; and on many occasions she was
faced with the choice of eating or spending the money on transportation
that would take her to school or to try and find a job.183
He said Ms. Recodo had “tried” to better her situation so that she could keep her son, and
he criticized the State for its position that they held no responsibility for helping her.184
He quoted the appellant’s social worker, who recognized that transportation and child
care were major problems in light of Recodo’s rural home:
The reservation is in a very rural area and commuting to Las Vegas
is fifty plus miles. And, we had at that time no suitable day care at
the reservation. He was an infant. We had Head Start, but there
was no way for her to leave him.185
Justice Springer concluded by characterizing the obstacles put in the way of Ms. Recodo
as “almost insurmountable.”186 He thus offered not only a much more empathic vignette;
he expressly discussed the particular burden that spatial isolation cast upon this rural
mother.
Like Justice Springer’s dissent in Bow, other judges have been more sensitive to
the particular structural barriers that rural parents face. One court lauded rural parents
specifically for making bi-monthly visits to their children, “despite the hardships
attendant to living in a rural area without private transportation.”187 Another court
183
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reversed the termination of parental rights of a woman who left her daughter with a
relative and did not re-claim her for several weeks.188 That court excused the mother’s
actions because she had taken refuge from her abusive husband (who had recently
sexually abused their other daughter) in a rural locale where she had no transportation or
telephone.189
Though none of these decisions turned solely on the rural setting, the locale is
highly relevant – and indeed integrally linked – to the structural challenges these parents
faced. Indeed, the spatial isolation and attendant transportation challenges that
characterize rural living aggravate disadvantage that would otherwise simply reflect
socioeconomic class. Further, long-time rural residents’ attachment to place means that
the place – the rural setting – should be central to assessing the parents’ choices and
behavior. As a critical piece of context, it will very often represent a mitigating factor.

C. Abortion
While traveling seventy miles on secondary roads may be inconsequential
to my brethren in the majority who live in the urban sprawl of Baltimore,
as the district court below and I conclude, such is not to be so casually
addressed and treated with cavil when considering the plight and effect on
a woman residing in rural Beaufort County, South Carolina.
Dissenting Judge Hamilton
Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant
(4th Cir. 2000)
Abortion is perhaps the only legal context in which the particular realities of rural
women have been an explicit focus – if only barely and briefly – in making law. Several
decisions have closely examined facts detailing the obstacles that informed consent and
188
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waiting period requirements represent for rural women seeking abortions. While such
consideration has not led to success in securing a less restricted abortion right, it has put
rural women on the radar screens of feminists as a distinct population of women who
share some significant challenges.190 In the following sections, I scrutinize judicial
responses to evidence about hardships which, collectively, are unique to rural women.191
I conclude that in the abortion context as in several others, the law has turned a blind eye
to the very real plight of this population.
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See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in
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J. dissenting).
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524 (citing Sullivan, Tietze & Dreyfoos, Legal Abortion in the United States, 1975-76, 9 FAMILY
PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 116, 121, 128 (1977)).
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1. Casey and the Undue Burden Test. In its 1992 decision, Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,192 the U.S. Supreme Court
reaffirmed the basic holding of Roe v. Wade:193 every woman has a fundamental right to
obtain an abortion prior to fetal viability. But, the Casey Court altered the legal analysis
by developing the undue burden test for determining the constitutionality of laws
restricting abortion.194 The Court applied the test to several restrictions in a Pennsylvania
law: a spousal notification requirement, a parental notification requirement, and a
mandatory informed consent provision that included a 24-hour waiting period. The Court
explained that “[a] finding of undue burden is shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”195 The joint opinion in Casey did not,
however, provide much instruction about how lower courts should determine whether a
regulation’s purpose is to impose an undue burden.196
At first blush, the undue burden inquiry appears to be a fact-intensive one.
Indeed, the Casey Court’s analysis of the so-called spousal notification provision,197
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505 U.S. 833 (1992).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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See, e.g., Ruth Burdick, The Casey Undue Burden Standard: Problems Predicted and Encountered, and
the Split over the Salerno Test, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 825 (1995-1996); Sandra Lynne Tholen & Lisa
Baird, Con Law Is As Con Law Does: A Survey of Planned Parenthood v. Casey in the State and Federal
Courts, 28 LOY.L.A.L REV. 971 (1994-1995).
195
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added).
196
See Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 354 (5th Cir. 1999).
197
The state law required a woman to produce a signed statement certifying that she had notified her
husband of her intent to have an abortion. Id. at 887-898. The spousal notification provision contained
some narrow exceptions, including for situations where the woman certified that her spouse was not the
father of her child; she could not find her spouse; the pregnancy was the result of a sexual assault by her
spouse which she reported; or she had reason to believe that notifying her spouse would cause him, or
another, to inflict bodily injury upon her. Id. at 908-909. A physician who performed an abortion without
obtaining the required statement would have her license revoked and be liable to the woman’s husband for
damages. Id. at 887-88.
193
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which it declared an undue burden, was fact driven.198 The plurality devoted twelve
pages to discussing this provision, examining both the trial court’s extensive findings of
fact,199 and an American Medical Association summary of research about domestic
violence.200 The court acknowledged that between two and four million women are
victims of severe domestic violence each year, with the worst abuse sometimes
associated with pregnancy.201 The Court determined that the spousal notification
provision “was likely to prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an
abortion.”202 Because many instances of domestic violence (i.e., unreported marital
sexual assault, psychological abuse, spousal infliction of harm upon a woman’s family
members) did not fall within the relatively narrow exceptions to the spousal notification
requirement, it would not simply make abortions more difficult to procure, but would
actually deter some women entirely, thus imposing an undue burden.203 Although the
Court found that the provision imposed no burden on the vast majority of women seeking
an abortion, it analyzed whether the provision was an undue burden only in relation to the
admittedly very small population of women it would affect: those who were unwilling to
share their decision with their spouse for fear of retaliatory violence.204
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Id. at 887-99.
The District Court found that “[t]he vast majority of women consult their husbands prior to deciding to
terminate their pregnancy,” but it also determined that “[a] wife may not elect to notify her husband of her
intention to have an abortion for a variety of reasons…” Id. at 888. The spousal notification requirement
would “…force women to reveal their most intimate decision-making on pain of criminal sanctions,” but
“the confidentiality of these revelations could not be guaranteed, since the woman’s records are not
immune from subpoena…” Id. at 889.
200
Id. at 888-91.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 894.
203
Id.
204
Even though the spousal notification requirement would affect less than one percent of women seeking
an abortion, the Casey Court decided that “the proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom
the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.” Id.
199
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Aside from the spousal notification provision, though, the Casey Court offered
little close factual examination of obstacles created by other aspects of the Pennsylvania
law. It upheld the law’s parental notification provision for minors by stating simply,
“[w]e have been over this ground before.”205 The Court reaffirmed prior decisions
holding that a law requiring a minor seeking an abortion to get parental consent is
constitutional, so long as it includes an adequate judicial bypass procedure.206
The Casey Court’s handling of the waiting period requirement is more
complicated because of conflicts between the district court’s factual findings and those
the Third Circuit chose to examine. The district court found that “for those women who
have the fewest financial resources, those who must travel long distances, and those who
have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others, the 24hour waiting period will be ‘particularly burdensome.’”207 It then concluded that the
waiting period would require every woman to make two trips to an abortion provider and
that 42 percent of women would have to travel more than an hour just to get to the nearest
clinic.208
The Third Circuit retreated, finding that the waiting period “may” require two
visits to a clinic.209 That court went on to conclude that “the wait does not prevent any
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Id. at 899.
Id.
207
Id. at 886.
208
The district court noted that in 1988, 58% of women getting abortions in the state had resided in just five
of Pennsylvania’s counties, meaning women living in any of the “other 62 counties must travel for at least
one hour, and sometimes longer than three hours, to obtain an abortion from the nearest provider.” 744 F.
Supp. 1323, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
209
Id. at 706 (emphasis added). “[T]his means that the overall cost of an abortion to her may increase by a
significant percentage.” Id. Planned Parenthood’s petition for certiorari discussed this problem, noting that
the Third Circuit had “substituted for the record actually developed here a factual finding implicitly
adopted in a different case involving completely distinct issues.” 1992 WL 551419 at 49-50. Planned
Parenthood argued that if undisputed factual findings could be discarded so cavalierly, the undue burden
test was “truly meaningless.” Id. The Supreme Court, however, never touched on the substituted factual
record, and seems to have accepted the Third Circuit’s version of it.
206
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women from having an abortion.”210 Rather than adhering to the factual findings below,
the appellate court seems to have altered them slightly to support a different result.
Although the Supreme Court purported to analyze the district court’s findings of fact,
referring to some of them as “troubling in some respects,”211 it played a semantic game
with the district court’s conclusions. The Supreme Court said the trial judge had not
concluded “that the increased costs and potential delays amount to substantial
obstacles,”212 the term it used to define “undue burden.” The plurality continued:
We also disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the "particularly
burdensome" effects of the waiting period on some women require its
invalidation. A particular burden is not of necessity a substantial obstacle.
Whether a burden falls on a particular group is a distinct inquiry from
whether it is a substantial obstacle even as to the women in that group.
And the District Court did not conclude that the waiting period is such an
obstacle even for the women who are most burdened by it. Hence, on the
record before us, and in the context of this facial challenge, we are not
convinced that the 24-hour waiting period constitutes an undue burden.213
From the beginning, then, the undue burden standard was applied inconsistently.
2. Waiting Periods and Rural Women under Casey.
Because my elected task is to reconsider the burden that abortion restrictions
place on rural women, I return to the district court’s detailed findings of fact regarding
the waiting period. In addition to determining that the waiting period would force all
women seeking abortions in Pennsylvania to make at least two visits to an abortion
provider, the court found that the waiting period would cause “delays far in excess of 24
hours,” from 48 hours to two weeks because most clinics and physicians do not perform
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Id. The Third Circuit also wrote that “possible overinclusiveness of the provision does not render it
irrational, especially given the serious and irreversible consequences of a hasty and ill-considered abortion
decision.”
211
Id. at 886
212
Id.
213
Id. at 886-87.
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abortions every day.214 Because the mandatory wait would require women to double
their travel time or stay overnight near an abortion facility, the court noted that many
would not only incur added expenses for transportation, lodging, child care and food, but
would also “lose additional wages or other compensation” if forced to miss work
twice.215 Further, the court noted, delays associated with the waiting period would push
some patients into the second trimester, thus substantially increasing the cost and risks of
the procedure.216
The court concluded: “Finally, women living in rural areas and those women that
have difficulty explaining their whereabouts, such as school age women, battered women,
and working women without sick leave, will also experience significant burdens in
attempting to effectuate their abortion decision, if a mandatory 24-hour waiting period
were in place.”217 Although the district court did not utilize the undue burden standard,
its findings indicate that the waiting period imposes significant burdens on some women.
It specifically enumerated rural women as one such group.
Two organizations that filed amicus briefs with the Supreme Court on behalf of
Planned Parenthood also closely examined the effects of the 24-hour waiting period and
expressed concern for rural women. The American Psychological Association’s brief
highlighted the district court’s findings regarding travel distances.218 The brief observed
that “[i]n many geographic areas of the country, women live long distances, even
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744 F. Supp. 1323, 1351 (emphasis added)
Id.
216
Id. at 1351-52 (emphasis added).
217
Id. at 1379 (emphasis added).
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1992 WL 12006399 (U.S., Mar. 06, 1992). These included the fact that one clinic was the primary
abortion provider for eighteen counties, and that among another clinic’s patients, 909 traveled at least 100
miles to reach the clinic. Id. at 29.
215
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hundreds of miles, from the nearest abortion provider.”219 It also cited research showing
that the greater a woman’s distance from a provider, the less likely she is to procure an
abortion.220
The NAACP’s also filed an amicus brief, which focused in part on the waiting
period’s impact on low-income urban women, 221 and also called special attention to the
“acute” problem for rural women. It cited data and examples from rural states, including
the fact that not a single physician residing in North Dakota performs abortions, and only
one South Dakota physician does so. The sole abortion clinic in northern Minnesota
serves 24 counties.222 The brief highlighted the fact that 82% of all U.S. counties – home
to one-third of all reproductive-age women – had no abortion provider as of 1985 and
that even more non-metro counties – 90% – have no provider.223 The NAACP thus
argued that the mandatory waiting period would effectively prohibit abortion for poor
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Id. at 29.
Id. at 28-29 (citing Shelton, Brann & Shultz, Abortion Utilization: Does Travel Distance Matter?, 8 J.
FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 260 (1976); Henshaw & VanVort, Abortion Services in the United States,
1987 and 1988, 22 J. FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 102, 105 (1990)). In non-metro areas, 93% of
counties have no provider, and 83% of (non-metro) women live in those counties. Henshaw & VanVort at
106.
221
1992 WL 12006401 (U.S., Mar. 06, 1992). It noted that women with family incomes under $11,000 are
almost four times more likely to have an abortion that those with family incomes over $25,000. Id. at 1718 (citing Radecki, A Racial and Ethnic Comparison of Family Formation and Contraceptive Practices
Among Low-Income Women, 106 Pub. Health Rep. 494, at n. 32, 33 (Sept./Oct. 1991)). “At least one study
indicates that for women below the poverty level, six out of ten births are unintended, i.e., unwanted or
mistimed, compared to three out of ten births to women above 200% of the poverty level.” Id. The brief
attributed the higher rate of unintended pregnancies among poor women to the greater incidence of
contraceptive failure and their preference for fewer children. Id.
222
Id. at 20-21. The brief noted the particular plight of Native American women, who often live in rural
areas:
In particular, poor Native American women face some of the largest obstacles, since
the Indian Health Services, which may be the only familiar provider of health care and
the only health service available for hundreds of miles, is prohibited from performing
abortions even if women can find the monetary resources to pay for the procedure
themselves.
Id.
223
Id. at 20. The brief cited as an example the Women's Health Services (WHS) clinic in Pittsburgh which
serves 34 counties in Pennsylvania, portions of Ohio, West Virginia, Maryland and New York. That
agency's Executive Director stated that women often travel three or four hours to reach the clinic,
sometimes much longer if they travel by bus. Id.
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women because of the increased cost of obtaining an abortion, 224 as well as “barriers of
distance and mobility.”225
In their arguments to the Supreme Court, both Planned Parenthood and amici
curiae thus highlighted the plight of rural women as a group or class, with further
emphasis on the aggravated burden for poor rural women. Yet the Justices in the Casey
plurality were unmoved by evidence of these burdens. The Court concluded that while
the increased cost and inconvenience to women might make it difficult for them to get
abortions, it would not actually deter them. Indeed, in spite of the district court and
plaintiffs’ attention to rural women, the word “rural” appears only once in 168 pages of
Casey opinions: Justice Blackmun’s separate opinion quoted the district court’s finding
that the waiting period “would pose especially significant burdens on women living in
rural areas and those women that have difficulty explaining their whereabouts.”226
When a majority of Justices in Casey concluded that the threat of domestic
violence from the spousal notification provision would deter women, but that the 24-hour
waiting period would merely inconvenience them, it set up a dichotomy between violence
(or the threat of it) on one hand, and economic disaster (or the threat of it) on the other.227
The Court essentially assumed that women will forego abortion to avoid the former but
not the latter. This assumption, however, is unfounded. While I do not dismiss or
224

Id. at 22.
Id. at 20. “Because most poor women have access only to county clinics, they often must wait weeks
for an appointment; at a crowded city clinic in New York, the wait time for an appointment was 4-15
weeks.” Id.
226
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 937 (Blackmun, J.)(citing Casey I, 744 F.Supp. 1323, 1378-79 (E.D.Pa. 1990)).
The plurality, however, did quote the district court as having found “that for those women who have the
fewest financial resources, those who must travel long distances, and those who have difficulty explaining
their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others, the 24-hour waiting period will be ‘particularly
burdensome.” Id. at 886 (quoting Casey I, 744 F. Supp. at 1352).
227
See infra text accompany notes [ ] (discussing threat of violence by anti-abortion protesters, if it
existed, as a reason to re-examine the two-trip requirement under Indiana law); infra notes [ ] (discussing
the constitutionality of FACE).
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downplay the significance and severity of physical abuse, it bears noting that many
victims of intimate abuse remain with their abusers for financial reasons.228 Women
sometimes opt not to leave, for example, because without the male breadwinner they do
not have the financial resources to support themselves and their children. They endure
violence in order to avoid poverty. Ironically, the plurality in Casey recognized this
phenomenon in analyzing the spousal notification provision, and it cited empirical
research in support of it.229 The plurality nevertheless elsewhere held that waiting
periods do not constitute undue burdens – not even on rural women. The Court believed
that waiting periods will simply be an inconvenience to some women, whereas fear of
intimate abuse will altogether prevent them from pursuing an abortion.
But survival is about more than avoiding a beating. If a woman will endure
violence in order to be able to feed herself and her family, the chances are also good that
she will forego an abortion in order to do so. Thus, the Casey Court was only half right
about self-preservation in relation to abortion. It was correct about women’s likely
response to the spousal notification provision, but it ignored the connection between the
perils of physical violence on the one hand and economic disaster on the other. If, as
even the Casey plurality recognized, women will endure physical violence to prevent
financial ruin, they will forego abortion for the same purpose.
228

There is support for the proposition that women engage in a cost-benefit analysis before deciding to
leave an abusive partner. Financial concerns, particularly when children are involved, make the final
decision to leave more difficult. See, e.g., Kristina Coop Gordon et al., Predicting the Intentions of Women
in Domestic Violence Shelters to Return to Partners: Does Forgiveness Play a Role, 18 J. OF FAMILY
PSYCH. 331 (2004) (suggesting that lack of personal income and low potential for securing employment are
factors that weigh in favor of staying in the relationship); Helen M. Hendey et al., Decision to Leave Scale:
Perceived Reasons to Stay in or Leave Violent Relationships, 27 PSYCH. OF WOMEN Q. 162, 163 (2003)
(stating that women are “more reluctant to leave violent relationships when they have investments of time,
marriage, money, children or emotional attachment”).
229
Casey, 505 U.S. at 891-92 (citing Herbert, Silver & Ellard, Coping with an Abusive Relationship: How
and Why do W omen Stay? 53 J. MARRIAGE & THE FAMILY 311 (1991); Aguirre, Why Do They Return?
Abused Wives in Shelters, 30 J. NAT. ASSN. OF SOCIAL WORKERS 350, 352 (1985) (abused women may
return to their abusers because they have no other source of income)).
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3. Post-Casey Decisions. The Casey Court explicitly stated that it was deciding
only the case before it, leaving the door open for other challenges to the provisions it
upheld.230 Subsequent courts have nevertheless been reluctant to deviate from Casey’s
holdings. As Gillian Metzger observes, “regulations that are not burdensome in
Pennsylvania may well be burdensome in other states where there are fewer abortion
providers or a more rural and poorer population.”231 By and large, however, courts have
been unwilling to examine in detail the particular burdens on the women in a state whose
abortion regulations are challenged. Yet states continue to enact regulations that prevent
at least some women – including those living some distance from an abortion provider –
from exercising their right to an abortion. These regulations not only impose waiting
period and informed consent requirements, some also involve parental consent for
minors.
a. Mandatory Waiting Periods, Informed Consent Laws and Spatial
Isolation. Utah Women’s Clinic v. Leavitt232 is an excellent example of the tendency of
post-Casey courts to assess constitutionality based more on a provision’s text than on the
factual record.233 The plaintiffs in Leavitt argued that because Utah is larger than
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Id. at 887.
Metzger, supra note [ ], at 2038.
232
844 F.Supp 1482, 1491 (D. Utah 1994).
233
Karlin v. Foust is another good example. 188 F.3d 446, 486 (7th Cir. 1999). The plaintiffs there
similarly presented evidence of “factual and demographic differences between Pennsylvania and
Wisconsin” focusing on “the geographic distribution and scarcity of abortion providers in relation to the
female population of Wisconsin.” The court was not convinced, however, concluding that “the
demographic differences between the two states were not significant enough to suggest that Wisconsin
women are quantitatively more burdened” by the Wisconsin law than Pennsylvania women had been by the
mandatory wait in Casey. Id. at 486. The court also went into a detailed discussion of the plaintiffs’
argument, based on a study of a Mississippi abortion regulation that had arguably caused a sharp decline in
the number of abortions in that state. The plaintiffs argued that Wisconsin and Mississippi were analogous,
but the Seventh Circuit, like the district court, found the Mississippi study methodologically flawed. The
court said the study had not controlled for the “persuasive effect of the law.” Id. at 487. That is, the court
speculated that the number of abortions in Mississippi might have declined not because the waiting period
231
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Pennsylvania and has only one metropolitan area, a 24-hour waiting period would be
more burdensome in that state than an equivalent regulation in Pennsylvania. Because
the Utah regulation was less restrictive than the provision upheld in Casey, however, the
federal district court concluded that it must be constitutional. Finding no significant
differences either between the Utah and Pennsylvania laws or in how they would affect
women in their respective states,234 the court went as far as to call the plaintiffs’ argument
a “red herring.”235
The Leavitt judge reasoned that all women seeking abortions must travel to a
clinic for the procedure, but that because the “travel burden is not a factor of state law,”
“getting to a clinic has absolutely nothing to do with the constitutional inquiry here.”236
The court offered this hypothetical by way of explanation for its logic:
A woman in Alaska, for example, could be required to travel 800 miles to
get to an abortion clinic merely because she lives in one place and the
nearest abortion clinic is on the other side of the state. But that certainly
doesn't constitute anything even approaching an undue burden. Roe v.
Wade may have established a constitutional right to an abortion, but it did
not require that a state provide abortion clinics in close proximity to every
woman's home. On the other hand, a waiting period which may require
two visits to a clinic imposes an additional burden. For some women, this
burden will require that they double their travel time by making a second
trip to the clinic. For other women, in a worst-case scenario where the
distance is such that it is impracticable to make a return visit, the burden
will require an overnight stay at a location near the clinic. 237
Thus, the district court in Utah saw the regulation’s greatest burden on any woman – no
matter where she lived in proximity to an abortion provider – as being an overnight stay

made getting an abortion more difficult, but because the materials presented as part of the informed consent
law convinced women not to get abortions. Id.
234
Id. at 1491.
235
Id. at 1491, n. 11.
236
Id. at 1491, n. 11.
237
Id. at 1491, n. 11.
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near that provider. It dismissed the possibility that some women would have to make two
trips and therefore never considered that multiple trips might each be several days long.
Because the Casey Court had not viewed that overnight stay as an undue burden, Leavitt
reasoned that the Utah provision also did not constitute one.238
Other judges in the post-Casey era have shown greater empathy for the plight of
rural women seeking abortion in the face of mandatory waiting periods. These judges,
however, have been federal district judges who were subsequently overruled or dissenters
from the decisions of Courts of Appeals. They have nevertheless called attention to the
circumstances of rural women despite colleagues in the majority who, like the district
judge in Leavitt, disregarded details of the obstacles facing rural women, or who saw the
obstacles as being “merely” financial.
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court in 1998 upheld state regulations that
imposed a mandatory 24-hour waiting period,239 Justice Sullivan’s dissent highlighted the
“undue burden on low-income women living in rural areas.” 240 Disputing the
chancellor’s characterization of this burden as “mere inconvenience,” Justice Sullivan
argued that the plaintiffs successfully demonstrated that the restrictions would preclude
“a substantial number of women from obtaining abortions altogether, and creat[e] an
undue burden due to travel and lodging expenses, child care costs, loss of wages, and
other compensation, and health risks.”241 Noting that only two Mississippi counties had
abortion providers, Justice Sullivan argued that the law was unconstitutional even if it
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Id. The court thus concluded that rural Utah women will not necessarily have to make two trips. Id.
Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Fordice, 716 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1998). The majority opinion did not use the
word “rural.”
240
Id. at 667 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
241
Id.
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created an undue burden only for low-income women and those living in rural areas.242
He also pointed to plaintiffs’ evidence that the number of Mississippi women obtaining
abortions had decreased by 13 percent since the law went into effect, suggesting that the
waiting period was actually preventing at least a tenth of the state’s women from
terminating their pregnancies.243
The Seventh Circuit in A Women’s Choice-East Side Clinic v. Newman, 244
similarly upheld an Indiana informed consent law that required that a woman be given
information in the presence of her doctor 18 hours before obtaining an abortion. This
2002 case was decided on probably the best developed factual record in the post-Casey
era. Yet the evidence presented swayed only Judge Diane Wood, in dissent, to agree with
the federal district court that the law constituted an undue burden.
The district court, relying in part on an updated version of the Mississippi study
cited in Fordice, struck down the Indiana law as unconstitutional.245 It found that the
supplemented study adequately demonstrated that the Mississippi law caused a 10 to13
percent decrease in abortions among that state’s residents, as well as a significant

242

Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98, holding that spousal consent law was unconstitutional based on
the small number of women with abusive husbands, for whom it would create an undue burden). Justice
Sullivan also pointed to plaintiffs’ evidence that the number of Mississippi women obtaining abortions had
decreased by 13% since the law went into effect, indicating that it was in fact preventing many women
from obtaining an abortion. This study was later discredited in Karlin, supra note [ ], but supplemented
prior to A Woman’s Choice, discussed infra at notes [ ] and accompanying text.
243
Id. at 667. The study also indicated that the number of second-trimester abortions in Mississippi had
risen by 18% since the law went into effect.
244
305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002). The decision also debated the burden represented by a so-called
“presence” requirement. The Indiana statute required information given to the women seeking the abortion
and that the information is given to the woman in the “presence” of the physician or physician’s assistant.
Id. at 685. Information about abortions could therefore not be given in a pamphlet, by telephone, or
through a web site. Id. The “presence” requirement thereby required the pregnant woman to make two
trips to the clinic—one for the information and the other to receive the abortion. Id. The court held that the
presence requirement did not create an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion. Id. at 693.
245
132 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1173-74 (S.D.Ind.2001). The plaintiffs in Karlin v. Foust relied on the same study,
but the court in that case questioned its validity. It was supplemented before the trial in A Women’s Choice,
correcting several aspects that had been criticized.
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increase in more expensive, more dangerous second-trimester abortions.246 Based on
these findings and on those of a similar study conducted in Utah, the court concluded that
the waiting period would also cause the number of abortions performed in Indiana to
decrease by 10 to 13 percent. The court further determined that this decline was due, not
to the persuasive nature of the materials, but rather to obstacles imposed by the waiting
period.247
But two of three members of the Seventh Circuit panel viewed the factual
evidence differently. Judges Easterbrook and Coffey refused to accept the district court’s
assessment of the study because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Indiana and
Mississippi were similar and that the consequences of the Mississippi law were likely to
be manifest in Indiana. They believed that the 10 percent decline in abortions, rather than
representing a practical consequence of the two-visit requirement, was simply a
consequence of the persuasive effect of the information. One asserted that Indiana should
have its law “evaluated in light of experience in Indiana.” 248 Echoing Casey’s elevation
of concerns about violence against women over other concerns about their well-being, he
suggested that a two-trip requirement would constitute an undue burden only if it deterred
women by increasing the possibility of violence against them. Judge Easterbrook
referred specifically to the “threat or actuality of violence at the hands of those tipped off
by a preliminary visit,” and said if evidence of such violence came to light in Indiana, it
would require reconsideration of informed consent laws across the nation.249
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Id. at 1173. The court also found that the Mississippi law caused a significant increase in the number of
that state’s residents who traveled out of state to obtain abortions and a significant decrease in the number
of other states’ residents who came to Mississippi for abortions. Id.
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248
Id. at 692-693.
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Id.
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Judge Coffey, also in the majority, openly flouted the hardships and concerns of
the 10 to 13 percent of women who might be unable to obtain an abortion by noting that
legislation which poses no substantial obstacle for 87 to 90 percent of a state's women,
“and may have the incidental effect of reducing the demand for abortions by merely 10 to
13 percent, is reasonable, sensible, and lawful.”250 He apparently disregarded the fact
that those women deterred from getting an abortion by the mandatory waiting period (as
many as 13%) were, in fact, unduly burdened by it. Rather than seriously evaluating the
evidence that substantiated the argument that waiting periods create undue burdens for
some women, both Easterbrook and Coffey determined that because the waiting period
would probably not increase violence against women, it was constitutional.
Once again, it was the dissenting judge who attended to the concerns of rural
women as a class. Judge Wood wrote that Indiana, “like all states” has “significant rural
areas and significant numbers of people living far from a reproductive health services
facility.”251 She cited statistics indicating that Indiana, with 11 abortion providers, had
one “for almost every 3,300 square miles.” 252 These clinics, which are not “distributed
with perfect geographical regularity,” are most likely concentrated in cities, Judge Wood
observed, meaning that women in rural Indiana lived “substantial distances from the
nearest facility.”253
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Id. at 704.
Id. at 711 (Wood, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 711.
253
Id. Judge Wood continued:
At most, the details the majority demands might suggest that more Indiana women can
withstand the burdens of the Indiana statute than their counterparts in Mississippi could.
But the question is not, for example, whether Indiana women as a group live closer to
abortion clinics. It is whether an Indiana woman living 60 miles away from a clinic in
Indiana who cannot afford (either financially, socially, or psychologically) to make two
visits, will respond the same way a Mississippi woman living 60 miles away from a clinic
in Mississippi with similar constraints did. To repeat, Casey made it clear that the set of
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The majority contingent in each of these opinions, like the federal district judge in
Leavitt, overlooked or denied the realities of many rural women. They also ignored a
critical aspect of Casey’s undue burden analysis of the spousal notification requirement:
the relevant group of women with respect to whom the requirement was to be assessed.
Informed consent and waiting period provisions do, in fact, have a greater impact upon –
and are in fact a greater deterrent to abortion for rural women. They are an even greater
burden upon, and deterrent to, low-income rural women.
I return to Leavitt and the geography of Utah to illustrate my point. A working
class woman in Salt Lake City who enjoys little work schedule flexibility would likely
have difficulty securing time off to go through both the informed consent meeting and
again to have the abortion. She could, however, arrange the two different appointments
on different days of the same week or on subsequent weeks, depending on her schedule.
If she is without a vehicle but lives in the Salt Lake metro area, she will have some public
transportation options to facilitate the journeys. Making two trips will likely be
inconvenient, even burdensome to her, and it may significantly increase the cost of the
abortion if she must schedule her second appointment in the second trimester. Still, the
burden of the waiting period on her is unlikely to be as great as that on a woman living in
southern Utah, as far as 300 miles from Salt Lake City.
Consider, for example, a woman in Boulder, Utah, in the shadow of Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument and 15 miles from Utah state highway 12. She

women we must consider are those who are burdened by the law, and it found 1% enough
to justify striking down the spousal notification rule. Maybe 10% of the women in
Mississippi have that problem and "only" 3% of women in Indiana do. No matter. The
district court was quite reasonable to find that women in Indiana are like all other people
and that their responses will be the same as those of women elsewhere.
Id. at 711-12.
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is 327 miles (7 hours) from Las Vegas,254 367 miles (7 hours and 55 minutes) from
Flagstaff,255 381 miles (7 hours and 58 minutes)from Aspen, Colorado,256 and a mere 261
miles (5 hours and 29 minutes) from Salt Lake City,257 the locations of the four nearest
abortion providers. These one-way travel times assume the woman has access to private
transportation. If she does not and must rely on public transportation, her situation is
even more dire. Boulder, Utah has no public transportation services. The nearest
Greyhound bus stop is 143 miles (3 hours and 40 minutes) away258 in Parowan, Utah.259
A woman without a car who lives in Boulder would thus have to borrow a car or hitchhike to Parowan and then take the bus to reach an abortion clinic.260
Again, if we assume a working class woman with little work schedule flexibility,
the woman in rural Utah may be unable to schedule her informed consent meeting and
her abortion on consecutive days. If, as Leavitt assumes, she is able to secure consecutive
days off from work, her burden may nevertheless be greater than an overnight hotel stay.
If she must travel several hours to reach the bus station and several more by bus to reach
254

See
http://maps.yahoo.com/dd_result?newaddr=&taddr=&csz=boulder+utah&country=us&tcsz=las+vegas+nev
ada&tcountry=us (last visited August 30, 2006).
255
See
http://maps.yahoo.com/dd_result?newaddr=&taddr=&csz=boulder+utah&country=us&tcsz=flagstaff+arizo
na&tcountry=us (last visited August 30, 2006).
256
See
http://maps.yahoo.com/dd_result?newaddr=&taddr=&csz=boulder+utah&country=us&tcsz=aspen+colorad
o&tcountry=us (last visited Sept. 4, 2006).
257
See
http://maps.yahoo.com/dd_result?newaddr=&taddr=&csz=boulder+utah&country=us&tcsz=salt+lake+city
+utah&tcountry=us (last visited August 30, 2006).
258
See http://maps.google.com/maps?oi=map&q=Parowan,+UT (last visited Sept. 2, 2006). See generally
Eli Sanders, As Greyhound Cuts Back, The Middle of Nowhere Means Going Nowhere, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 6,
2004, at A10 (discussing the impact on rural America of Greyhound’s dramatic cuts in service).
259
See http://www.greyhound.com/home.asp (last visited Sept. 2, 2006). Parowan is located in Iron
County, which is the county nearest to Boulder that has a public transportation network. See
http://www.apta.com/links/state_local/ut.cfm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).
260
Greyhound offers two buses a day from Parowan, Utah to Salt Lake City, one leaving at 2:50am and
another leaving at 11:05am. Each trip lasts four hours. Buses from Salt Lake City to Parowan leave twice
a day, at 8:30am and 6:00pm. See http://www.greyhound.com/scripts/en/TicketCenter/Step3.asp (last
visited Sept. 5, 2006).
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the abortion provider, and again to return home, and if bus schedules are very limited, she
may need three or more consecutive days off work – as well as several nights’ hotel stay
– to accomplish the sought-after termination. Also contrary to the Leavitt court’s
assumption, the burden on a rural woman seeking an abortion may be greater than
assumed in Casey because, in fact, she is unable to take several consecutive days off
work. Women in this situation will not only have to make two return journeys to Salt
Lake City by whatever means are available, each of those journeys may require multiple
days. Thus, the worst-case scenario may not be merely an overnight stay. It may be
several days’ stay. It may, in fact, require two journeys, each lasting several days.
An even more dramatic example could be generated from the geography of
Alaska, with its dearth of abortion services, which the Leavitt court facetiously used to
illustrate its position that there is no constitutional right to convenience in procuring an
abortion.261 But Casey made accessibility relevant by adopting the undue burden
standard, and at some point, even the Leavitt court might concede, waiting periods
constitute an undue burden for the most isolated, most disadvantaged women. My aim is
thus not to identify the most extreme example of hardship created by waiting periods. It
is, rather, to demonstrate that courts have not seriously considered the practical obstacles
confronting rural women. As Judge Wood wrote in A Woman’s Choice, the undue
burden question “is whether an Indiana woman living 60 miles away from a clinic in
Indiana who cannot afford (either financially, socially, or psychologically) to make two
visits” will be deterred from exercising her fundamental right.262 It is not only about the

261

Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. at 1491, n. 11.
A Woman’s Choice, 305 F.2d at 711. Specifically, at this point in the opinion, Wood was arguing that
the Mississippi study had shown that the state’s informed consent law had deterred Mississippi women
from pursuing abortion.

262
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woman who is worst-situated for getting an abortion; it is about all those who will be
deterred by the regulation.
Certainly, some women in rural areas will be better situated to secure abortions
than others, even in states with mandatory waiting periods. Women with job flexibility
and security, access to a car, child care and – of course – money, will find it easier to
overcome the obstacles. But the Casey Court said that, for the purposes of analyzing any
regulation, “[t]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a
restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”263 Further, the Casey Court
found sufficient the mere 1% of all women who would be deterred by the Pennsylvania
spousal notification requirement. So, even taking Casey’s parsimonious approach to the
undue burden test as the starting point, courts applying the standard have not only not
been sensitive, they have not even been realistic about the very real barriers that
regulations put in the way of rural women seeking abortion.
While Leavitt may be correct that Roe v. Wade did not guarantee the right to
convenience in procuring an abortion, at some point, waiting periods create so much
“inconvenience” that they impede some women’s access to that right. That is, they
effectively preclude it. This is surely the case for many rural women who live literally
hours from the nearest abortion provider. Their hardship is exacerbated by the specific
circumstances that mark many of their lives: inadequate transportation, limited or
nonexistent child care, lack of job flexibility and security, and overall economic
vulnerability. Each of these circumstances aggravates the burden that the mandatory
waiting period imposes on a given rural woman.
In contrast to these abortion decisions, precedents in other areas of the law
263

Casey, 505 U.S. at 894.

- 59 -

acknowledge the reality, as well as the legal relevance, of the hardships created by spatial
isolation from centers of commerce and the services located there. 264 In disability,
workers compensation, and insurance coverage settings, for example, courts recognize
that those who live in rural areas are at a disadvantage in seeking replacement
employment, in receiving appropriate rehabilitation, and even in obtaining medical
care.265 These judicial decisions appropriately accommodate the reality that many rural
residents must travel significant distances for access to such services and opportunities.
A trilogy of Colorado workers’ compensation cases is illustrative.266 The
Colorado Supreme Court held in these consolidated cases that rural workers who could
not secure replacement employment because of their limited rural labor markets could
nevertheless receive benefits.267 Each of the cases involved a rural-dwelling worker with
relatively few skills,268 and each had reached “maximum medical improvement.” The
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In a rare civil procedure case addressing the practical effect of rural locale, a federal district court held
that, because they “live in rural areas and lack resources and access to transportation,” migrant workers
seeking to opt-in to a class action need not have their consents authenticated because it “could well present
a heavy burden, if not an insuperable obstacle” to their participation. Roebuck v. Hudson Valley Farms,
239 F.Supp.2d 234, 240 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
265
See, e.g., Brodsky v. City of Phoenix Dept. Ret. System Bd., 900 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Ariz. 1995)(police
officer with knee injury was still capable of “reasonable range of duties” in urban police department and
thus not eligible for disability, although court recognized that a similarly disabled officer in a rural setting
with smaller force might not be able to perform a reasonable range of duties for his department).
In a 2001 decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a former custodian
with the transit authority who sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was not “substantially
limited” in his ability to work because his back injury did not prevent him from finding alternate
employment. Duncan v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 240 F.3d 1110 (D.C.Cir. 2001).
Concurring, Judge Randolph complained of the “geographic disparity” that would result from this rule. He
observed that if identical individuals with identical impairments worked for the same company, the one
working in a rural area would “wind up being classified as disabled under the ADA more readily” than one
in a “major metropolitan area where more jobs are available.” Id. at 1118.
266
Weld County School District v. Bymer, 955 P.2d 550 (Colo. 1998).
267
Id.
268
These were two laborers with limited English skills who had completed the 4th grade in Mexico and a
custodian whose injury prevented her from driving long distances. Id. at 551-52. In the first two cases, the
court of appeals had affirmed the ALJs’ consideration of “the claimant’s commutable labor market” in
deciding “permanent and total disability” PTD. Id. at 552-53. In the third case, however, the court of
appeals reversed, declaring “disability is a function of impairment, not geography or job availability.” Id.at
553. In all three cases, both administrative law judges and administrative appellate bodies had declared the

- 60 -

crux of the inquiry, the court said, was whether employment is “reasonably available to
the claimant given his or her circumstances.”269 Because it was not the fault of these
rural workers that the rural economy provided them no job opportunities, they could
receive benefits. They were not required to commute long distances or to move in order
to secure replacement employment.270
Other courts have been similarly empathic regarding the practical consequences
of rural residents’ spatial isolation, holding, for example, that an insurer must pay the
transportation costs associated with obtaining necessary treatment.271 As one court
expressed it, “for citizens living miles from our cities the inability to obtain compensation
for transportation expenses may result in life sustaining medical treatment being
unavailable.”272 In another matter, the Colorado Supreme Court held that an insurer
should reimburse a claimant’s wife for providing home health care services, which had
been prescribed by his physician, when home health care services were unavailable in his

workers to be permanently and totally disabled, but the Colorado Court of Appeals had reached
inconsistent results.
269
Id. at 557. In Parsons v. Employment Security Commission, 71 N.M. 405, 379 P.2d 57 (1963), a woman
who had worked as a grocery clerk quit her job and moved with her husband, who had been laid off, to
property they owned in a rural community with only one grocery story. The woman was unable to secure
work at the grocery store, or at either of the two stores within commutable distance. She did not want to
work as a waitress or secretary and was therefore unable to secure employment. The Commission found
that her voluntary unemployment made her ineligible for benefits, but the New Mexico Supreme Court
reversed, finding that she had made reasonable efforts to secure employment. Id. at 411, 379 P.2d at 61.
See also Wood Mosaic Co. v. Brown, 199 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Ky.Ct. App. 1947) (finding 64-year-old
laborer who had worked as a carpenter, blacksmith, and coal miner to be permanently disabled when he
injured his arm; court noted that in rural area where he lived, alternative “vocational opportunities” were
restricted to very few fields).
270
While the court never explicitly mentioned the claimants’ spatial isolation, it recognized the rural job
market realities in its decision to uphold their status as permanently and totally disabled. Indeed, the court
wrote that considering a claimant’s access to employment is both reasonable and consistent with the “Act’s
purpose of assisting injured workers who are unable to secure employment.” Id. at 557. Dissenting Justice
Kourlis explicitly mentioned the rural nature of the claimants’ locales, stating that they “may have to move
in order to find work, just as someone who is laid off may need to move.” Id. at 561. He argued
vigorously that “access to employment within the labor market where a claimant resides is not an
appropriate factor to consider” in awarding PTD benefits. Id.
271
See, e.g., Allstate Insurance Company v. Smith, 902 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Colo. 1995)
272
Id. at 1388.
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rural community.273 In a similar vein, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that an insurer
must pay for a physician-prescribed hot tub in the claimant’s home when the rural locale
in which he lived made travel to a health club unfeasible.274
Cases such as these demonstrate judicial empathy for the hardships – including
financial costs – associated with spatial isolation, a hallmark of rural life. They also
recognize that such hardships aggravate the economic vulnerability that is a constant for
many rural residents. Such decisions stand in stark contrast to the lack of understanding
judges have shown about these hardships and vulnerability in relation to abortion access,
as well as other issues with particular impact on rural women.
b. Judicial Bypass Procedures and Lack of Anonymity. Rural women have
also been acknowledged in abortion litigation challenging judicial bypass procedures for
minors. The issues in these cases have been both the spatial isolation associated with
rural places and the lack of anonymity people experience there. The 1999 decision of the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Memphis Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist is a case in
point.275 Sundquist examined a Tennessee law that permitted minors to seek judicial
bypass of the parental consent requirement, but which imposed several restrictions on the
process. The minor was required, for example, to file her petition in either the county in
which she resided or in which the abortion was sought, and to swear that she consulted
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Suetrack USA v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 902 P.2d 854, 855-56 (Colo. 1995)
Continental Casualty Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 567 So.2d 1208 (Ala. 1990). The insurer in that case was
found liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress for unreasonably delaying payments to the
claimant’s health care providers, causing some of them to deny him services and pain medication. Id. at
1210. With respect to the hot tub, the insurer had challenged the doctor’s recommendation, repeatedly
asking him to justify it. Id. at 1214-15. The insurer then took the position that the unavailability of a health
club was due to “McDonald's own decision to live in a rural area and that CNA would not want to pay for
an expensive hot tub and then have to install another one if McDonald moved.” Id. at 1215. The appellate
court upheld the intentional infliction of emotional distress judgment.
275
175 F.3d 456 (6th Cir.1999).
274
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with a physician about the abortion before seeking the bypass.276 The majority upheld
the law as constitutional.277
Judge Keith, in dissent, discussed at length the particular hurdles faced by rural
minors seeking to use the procedure. He focused on both transportation and
confidentiality problems. With regard to the former, he noted the lack of trains and the
fact that even “buses do not reach the rural areas.”278 With respect to the latter, Judge
Keith observed that a “minor’s actions can easily be detected by relatives and friends in
rural areas.” 279 He included in his opinion numerous detailed anecdotes from the
testimony of officials at Memphis’ and Knoxville’s abortion providers. The director of
counseling at the Knoxville Center for Reproductive Health testified about problems
arising from the law’s venue restriction:
The areas surrounding Knoxville where many of our patients come from
are very rural. It is next to impossible to go to any public place
completely undetected. One minor patient told us she couldn't pursue a
waiver from the local court because her aunt worked there. Another tried
to pursue a waiver in her home county, only to discover the judge assigned
to her case was her former Sunday school teacher. She was so afraid of
appearing in front of someone who knew her and her parents that she left
and did not pursue the waiver. 280
While lack of anonymity prevented minors from applying for judicial bypass in their
home counties, the director also expounded on the difficulties created by the alternative:
traveling to the county where the abortion provider is located to apply for judicial bypass
there. Noting that some patients must travel as far as six hours to reach Knoxville for an

276

Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 461.
278
Id. at 474 (quoting declaration of Judy G. Stogner, Director of Clinical Services at Memphis Planned
Parenthood)
279
Id. at 476. “Minors who do not have cars, which are most of our clients, must arrange transportation
with a friend or a trusted relative. Often rides do not show up and they have to re-schedule.” Id. (quoting
Declaration of Connie Simpson, Director of Counseling at the Knoxville Center for Reproductive Health).
280
Id. at 485 (emphasis original).
277

- 63 -

abortion, the director testified that most minors can only get there once – for the medical
procedure.281
The Director of the Memphis Center for Reproductive Health similarly touched
on the confidentiality and transportation issues that plague minors living in rural areas.
She shared the anecdote of a patient who was reluctant to get from her local bank a
money order made payable to the abortion clinic. The woman had feared that the tellers,
who knew her, might disclose her activities to others.282 The director attested to the
particular difficulties minors have in going undetected because the lack of public
transportation in rural Tennessee leaves them relying on friends or extended family for
transportation, while also factoring in as much as four hours of travel time each way.283
Judge Keith responded to this evidence with a compelling and compassionate
summation of the situations faced by many young women seeking abortions. He gave
special attention to the additional challenges facing those who live in rural areas:
Sitting in its "ivory tower," the majority ignores the realities of the
situation and claims that making phone calls over a forty-eight hour period
cannot be characterized as a substantial burden, thereby mocking the
plight of these young girls for whom making a single telephone call,
particularly during the court's business hours, may mean walking a long
distance in a rural area to make a toll call from a public telephone, all
without arousing suspicion or having her conversation overheard and her
confidentiality destroyed.
***
Furthermore, in the case of small rural towns where this type of bypass
may most likely be sought, the minors may feel that their confidentiality
and anonymity are also at stake if they have to contact a law office where
a relative or acquaintance may be employed as support staff.284
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Id.
Id. at 486-87.
283
Id. at 486-87.
284
Id. at 478.
282
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Judge Keith thus took seriously the hardships the Tennessee law created – because of
spatial isolation and lack of anonymity – for young rural women in particular.
But judicial responses to lack of anonymity in other contexts have been more
realistic and empathic than the majority in Sundquist. As is the case with spatial
isolation, courts outside the abortion context have held the lack of anonymity with which
rural residents live to be legally relevant. That rural residents are aware of community
events and each others’ lives is noted in both civil and criminal decisions.285 One court
assumed, for example, that an informant was more credible because the “basis of his
knowledge sprang . . . from rural soil rather than from the faceless anonymity of an urban
swarm.”286 The court characterized reputation in a rural place as “better
substantiated.”287 The lack of anonymity associated with rural communities arises most
often in relation to whether a defendant can get a fair trial in a rural venue.288 A North
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See, e.g., Roberts v. Dutton, 368 F.2d 465, 470 (5th Cir.1966) (taking judicial notice that in a rural
county “information concerning witnesses and events is more generally known than in large cities”) cited in
Foxworth v. Florida, 267 So.2d 647, 651 (Fla. 1972); State v. Havlena, 1998 WL 939628 (Neb. App. 1998)
(circumstances of convict ordered to pay restitution not a “deep secret” in rural community).
286
Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 521 n.7, 313 A.2d 847, 856, n. 7 (1974) (citing United States v.
Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971)).
287
Id. See also Idaho v. Missamore, 114 Idaho 879, 880-881 (1988) (police officer stopped defendant
driver based on his personal knowledge that defendant had no drivers license).
288
See, e.g., State v. Brown, 4 Kan. App. 2d 729, 734 (1980)(exercise of peremptory challenges in
chambers is acceptable in rural areas because jurors are often known to parties and counsel); State v.
Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 636 (1987) (suggesting jury selection should be more closely scrutinized in rural
areas where it is “inevitable that members of jury panel will be acquainted with trial participants or
victims”); Knapp v. Leonardo, 46 F.3d 170, 181 (2d Cir. 1995)(Oakes, J., dissenting)(arguing for grant of
habeas petition because 83% of 1417 members of jury pool were disqualified for cause from “emotionally
super-charged” trial in rural New York).
Mere acquaintance by jurors with party or attorney is often insufficient to justify a change in
venue or to constitute error. See, e.g., Jernigan v. State, 475 S.W.2d 184, 185-86 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971)
(“many cases are tried in rural areas wherein all of the jurors know all of the lawyers, litigants and
witnesses” and this is not necessarily grounds for mistrial); Peyton v. State, 897 So.2d 921, 953-54 (Miss.
2003) (“not unusual for potential jurors to know parties and witnesses in trials” in rural areas, but where
jurors assure courts they can be impartial, no error to permit them to serve on jury); Toyota Motor Corp. v.
McLaurin, 642 So.2d 351, 359-61 (Miss. 1994)(McRae, dissenting) (“in our rural state the situation where
most citizens of a county have had someone in their family represented by either party’s counsel occurs
more often than not”); State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1977)(“almost impossible, in some of our
rural counties, to choose a jury who did not know witnesses and did not know the parties or something
about the parties”; knowledge alone insufficient to disqualify from jury service); Dupuy v. Allara, 457
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Carolina decision, for example, held that the defendant could not have gotten a fair trial
in a "small, rural and closely-knit county where the entire county was, in effect, a
neighborhood.”289
The issue of possible bias also arises in civil cases. A Mississippi trial judge in
1985 referred to “these rural counties that we have in Mississippi where the people know
each other.”290 The North Dakota Supreme Court wrote in 1994 that “in nearly all
counties in our state . . . most jurors know something about every person in the county,
their families, or their businesses.”291 Judges refer to “gossip”292 or “word-of-mouth
publicity,”293 that may interfere with a defendant’s ability to get a fair trial in a rural
locale.294

S.E.2d 494, 499 (W.Va. 1995)(“fact of life that in many rural jurisdictions” local physicians are likely to
have contacts with prospective jurors); Keyes v. Amundson, 343 N.W.2d 78, 86-87 (N.D. 1983) (noting
unavoidability of jurors viewing accident scenes in rural counties).
289
State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 256, 307 S.E. 2d 339, 348 (1983). The court overturned the conviction
and granted a new trial to defendant who had been tried in a county with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants.
The victim in that case was “a well-known and respected dairy farmer,” and a third of potential jurors had
“acknowledged familiarity” with him or some member of his family. State v. Vereen, 312 N.C. 499, 510,
324 S.E.2d 250 (1985) (distinguishing case at bar from facts of Jerrett). Cf State v. McKisson, 2003 WL
21649214, at *6 (N.C.App.) (unpublished case) (upholding denial of change of venue where jurors did
not personally know victims or their families, in spite of defendant’s arguments that crime had “rocked”
rural county and pretrial publicity had “infected” jury pool).
290
Great American Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Dawson, 468 So.2d 87, 90-91 (Miss. 1985).
291
State v. Brooks, 520 N.W.2d 796, 802 (N.D. 1994) (Meschke, J., concurring) (justifying N.D. Rev.
606(b) which does not permit affidavits, evidence, or testimony by a juror about the jury’s discussion, even
when a juror discloses to the others some personal knowledge about a party). See also Farmers Union
Grain Terminal Ass’n v. Nelson, 223 N.W.2d 494 (1974) (noting difficulty in finding a family in a rural
community that had not done business with defendant-owned or operated facility, but this would not
indicate a direct relationship that should disqualify from jury service).
292
See, e.g., People v. Nesler, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 476 & n.1 (Cal. 1997) (“hometown trial” in rural
community “entailed the strong chance that jurors would hear gossip about the case and about defendant”;
court referred to “likelihood of local gossip, rumor, and discussion of the case within this close-knit
community”); State v. Breding, 526 N.W.2d 465, 468-469 (N.D. 1995) (defendant argued that “rumor,
gossip, and speculation ‘small community living generates as a matter of course’ should have been
sufficient alone” to support his motion for change of venue but court refused, noting that to accept
argument would require change of venue in every serious criminal prosecution in rural county).
293
State v. White, 311 N.C. 238, 242, 316 S.E.2d 42, 44 (1984).
294
See, e.g., Wolfe v. Brigano, 232 F.3d 499, 500-04 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2000)(Wellford, J., concurring) (trial
judge acknowledged “we’re in a small community and you hear matters, and . . .you read things”); Roberts
v. C.W. Adams & Son Co., 110 S.W.314, 316 (Ky. App. 1908)(describing rural neighborhood “where
everybody knows in a general way everybody’s business”).
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In light of judicial recognition, in a range of legal contexts, of the familiarity or
lack of anonymity that characterizes rural areas, judicial failure to take seriously this
reality as it relates to abortion regulations is especially unfortunate. In an early essay on
Roe v. Wade, MacKinnon argued that most women do not control the conditions under
which they have sex. She asserted, for example, that women may be reluctant to use
birth control because of its social meaning – specifically signaling a woman’s sexual
availability.295 A related argument applies to rural women, who may be less likely to use
contraceptives because of their lack of anonymity in seeking such services in their
communities. If this is true regarding contraceptives, it is surely also true regarding
abortion, particularly given the more conservative attitudes rural residents hold on this
subject.296 This is all the more reason rural women may be deterred from abortion by
judicial bypass procedures that so casually risk their anonymity.
4. Conclusion
Given that abortion is the sole legal context in which courts have been confronted
with realities of rural women as a class, it is an understatement to say that the response
has been disappointing. Casey and its progeny have consistently discounted or denied the
impact that spatial isolation and lack of anonymity have on rural women who seek to
exercise their constitutional right to procure an abortion. Suggesting that physical
distance, lack of transportation, and economic vulnerability are insufficient to deter
women from pursuing an abortion – that they are not substantial obstacles – is callous
and insulting. This is particularly so when those deciding sit, as Judge Hamilton put it,
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Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy and Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade (1983) in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93-102 (1987), discussed in MARTHA CHAMALLAS,
INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 48 (2d ed. 2003).
296
See supra notes [ ] and accompanying text.
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amidst an urban sprawl, with myriad services and public transportation.297
These decisions are especially disappointing in light of law’s recognition
elsewhere of the hardships associated with this aspect of rural living. Indeed, ironically,
federal judges in another abortion context have called attention to the plight of rural
women. In contrast to the lack of empathy the same courts have shown to rural women in
relation to application of the undue burden test, courts upholding the constitutionality of
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrance Act (“FACE”) have relied on the needs of rural
women to justify their decisions. In the 2000 decision in United States v. Gregg, for
example, the Third Circuit upheld FACE, concluding that the misconduct it proscribes
exacerbates the “shortage of abortion-related services exists in this country.”298 The
court noted that 83 percent of all U.S. counties have no abortion provider, and that the
shortage is particularly acute in rural areas because reproductive health clinics tend to be
“located primarily in metropolitan areas.”299 Ironically, this is the same Court of Appeals
which, in Casey, dismissed a statistic demonstrating that 82 percent of counties have no
provider. “In a rural community,” the Third Circuit wrote in Gregg, “only one provider
usually exists in a large geographical area, thus making it a preferred target for antiabortionists because elimination of that provider eliminates abortion services for all
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See supra notes [ ] and accompanying text (discussing Casey’s core holding regarding waiting period).
226 F.3d 253, 264 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing legislative record). See also United States v. Bird, No. 9520792, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33988 (5th Cir. Sept. 24, 1997) (upholding constitutionality of FACE,
relying on Congress’s commerce clause power; among supporting facts was that only abortion provider in
South Dakota commutes from Minnesota); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423 (C.D.Cal.1995)
(finding that violent attacks on abortion facilities "sharply curtail access to health care for many women,
particularly women living in rural areas"). Indeed, Terry v. Reno discusses how abortion violence in some
rural areas forced medical clinics to "... stop providing not only abortions, but other reproductive services
as well, including pre and post natal care." 101 F.3d 1412, 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Gregg, 226 F.3d at 264.
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women in that area.”300
While Gregg and other FACE decisions have acknowledged rural realities
associated with physical distance in the context of concluding that an interstate market
for abortion services exists, courts applying the undue burden test have stubbornly
downplayed this fact and the gravity of the obstacles it creates for rural women. Gregg
observed that the closure of an abortion provider would “eliminate abortion services for
all women” in a rural area that had a single abortion provider. But Casey and its progeny
have assumed that rural women will be able to get abortions regardless of the distance
they must travel to an abortion provider, even if they must make the trip twice. Current
“undue burden” precedents – in sharp contrast to Gregg’s “elimination” language –
conclude that rural women will simply experience inconvenience in exercising this
fundamental right.

IV.

Conclusion
No law addresses the deepest, simplest, quietest, and most widespread
atrocities of women’s everyday lives. The law that purports to address
them . . . does not reflect their realities or . . . is not enforced. It seems
either the law does not exist, does not apply, is applied to women’s
detriment, or is not applied at all. The deepest rules of women’s lives are
written beneath or between the lines, and on other pages.301
Catharine A. MacKinnon (2005)
Angela Harris argued almost two decades ago that, “to energize legal theory, we
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hitherto silenced.”302 I have begun here to do precisely that: to energize feminist legal
theory by surfacing the stories of rural women, one group who have been overlooked,
misunderstood and thus silenced. Rural women have been silenced not only because of
the lack of power that stems from their socioeconomic disadvantage, but also because of
their physical distance from public places, from centers of power, from services, and
from opportunity of all sorts. The deepest atrocities of their every day lives have often
gone unseen, without legal redress due in part to that same isolation, but also because of
our society’s pervasive urban presumption. The vulnerability and hardship with which
they live have been discounted – or simply held against them as their fault – as their
children have been taken away, and as they have been faulted for their acts of selfpreservation. The fundamental right to abortion has been denied to many of them as
restrictions on that right have been upheld as inconsequential, even as evidence has
shown how heavily the restrictions weigh upon them.
Judges in many of the cases I have discussed may not understand that rural
women generally have less economic, social, cultural and political power than both urban
residents and rural men. They may not understand that spatial isolation and lack of
anonymity, for example, limit these women. But if legal decision-makers do in fact
understand these realities, they are foolish to assume that these women are free, equal and
responsible when they fail to hold a job, contact their children, simply walk away from an
abusive relationship, or get an abortion in the face of very real obstacles.303
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Rural women are not playing on the same field that urban women do any more
than women of color are playing on the same field on which white women play. We no
longer presume that the same laws that will serve the interests of women in the United
States will necessarily serve the interests of women in Azerbaijan or Norway or
Mozambique.304 We understand that laws do not apply in a cultural vacuum. Just as we
have become sensitive to culture,305 we must become sensitive to place, to spatiality, to
geography. We must become sensitive to rurality, and we can only begin to do that by
acknowledging its very existence, by learning to see it.
I have written in this article of rural women as a group, and I have claimed that
they have many common concerns, although I am acutely aware of the differences among
rural communities,306 as well as among rural women. But “[e]ven a jurisprudence based
on multiple consciousness must categorize,” for without categorization, each individual is
isolated, and moral responsibility and social change are impossible.307 I thus name the
category “rural women,” even while agreeing with Angela Harris that such categories
should be “explicitly tentative, relational, and unstable.”308
We must begin – and continue – to investigate the intersection between gender
and spatiality, including its impact on autonomy and moral agency, the complexities of
women’s productive and reproductive roles, and the web of connections that links these
304
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with societal and community expectations.309 Like any other aspect of one’s situation or
any marker of identity, living in a rural area or “being a rural woman” does not exist in
isolation. Literary theorists Creed and Ching, in arguing for scholarly attention to the
rural-urban dichotomy, have observed that “contemporary discussions of the
fragmentation and recombination of identities locate this process almost exclusively in
the city.”310 This must change if the law is to do justice in the lives of rural women.
While I have begun the task of theorizing the rural, practical lessons should also
be taken from my analysis and critique.311 First, it does not pay for advocates to be subtle
about rural realities. Lawyers litigating cases such as those I have discussed must be
willing to explain how the rural context alters the power dynamics and limits actors’
options, whatever the legal right or issue at stake. Judges and other legal decision-makers
must be taught how rurality constrains autonomy and choice.
Second, the use of this word “rural” may disserve rural women. I have
characterized as “rural” many of the situations and settings I have discussed, just as the
litigants, attorneys or judges did. Rural women as litigants, however, might be wiser to
use terms such as spatial isolation or lack of anonymity to focus upon the precise rural
characteristic that is relevant to the inquiry. Doing so should help moderate the rhetorical
potency of the term “rural,” which so often carries positive, even idyllic associations.312
Those associations and the notion that rural hardships are ameliorated by the scenic and
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serene aspects of rural living may obscure or disguise the challenges the rural resident is
facing.313
As Judith Baer has observed, “[f]acts do not interpret themselves.” 314 Judges and
juries apply law to facts and, in so doing, give legal meaning to those facts and determine
their legal significance. Those who care about the well-being of women – all women –
must find new ways to help legal decision-makers understand the facts that comprise the
context in which rural women live and make decisions. Catharine MacKinnon has
written that it is an “aspiration indigenous to women across place and across time” to be
“no less than men . . . not to lead a derivative life, but to do everything and be anybody at
all.”315 Rural women share that aspiration, and feminist theory can inform practice to
help them realize it.
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